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Diaspora, Nationalism and Women: Transnational Nationalism and Korean American Women’s Writings

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For the last decades, South Korea propelled to mobilize transnational nationalism to appropriate Korean diaspora space and resources for national purpose. Diaspora space is not just a marginal space of expatriate migrants. Rather, the nation-state can capture the transnational social space of diaspora to construct flexible networks of transnational capitalism. This paper explored how diaspora could be appropriated for nationalism, and conducted textual analysis of two Korean American women’s writing. The analysis showed that their voices were not politically organized in terms of critical diasporic consciousness. Rather, they were blurred and subsumed in Korean nationalist narratives. I assume that the relative absence of radical feminist voices in their writings were resulted by the gendered nature of transnational nationalism.

Key words: Korean American, diaspora, transnational nationalism, gender, South Korea

1. Introduction

Since the last decades, Korean diasporic communities have experienced a rapid resurrection of Korean nationalism, which is related to both South Korean governmental institutions and Korean diasporic organizations. Accentuating “national competence for the globalized capitalist society” (Overseas Koreans Foundation 1997: 6), the South Korean government has employed strong nationalist discourses to appropriate human, capital and organizational resources of overseas Korean communities for its national development (Park 2009). This national movement implies that transnational social space of diasporic communities is not necessarily an alternative space to the nation-state. Rather, it is always threatened by the potential possibility of being contested and negotiated by nationalism.
Following Park’s (2009) recent argument on Korean nationalism, this paper regards recent Korean nationalism aimed to overarch Korean diaspora communities as ‘transnational nationalism’. It subsequently investigates the ways in which the collective subjectivity of Korean American communities is transnationally produced. Especially, among those discourses surrounding contemporary Korean nationalism, I’ll focus on analyzing the discourse of the ‘Global Korean Network (GKN)’ initiated by the Overseas Korean Foundation (OKF) of South Korea (see also Park 2009). The principal goal of the GKN is to restore Korean national (or ethnic) identity throughout diasporic communities, to construct medium-ranged communication space for both South Korean communities and overseas Korean communities, and to maximize their political, economic and cultural synergy (Overseas Koreans Foundation 1997; 1998). However, as the nation-state itself is often problematized as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983), I assume that the collective subjectivity of diasporic communities would also involve certain process of marginalization of multiple differences such as gender, sexuality and hybridity.

For theoretical basis, this paper focuses on ‘diaspora’ (and diasporic collectivity) and its relation to women, gender, and sexuality. For the empirical analysis, first, I will conduct discourse analysis of the GKN in the US context. Archives would include national regulations and laws on overseas Koreans (and Korean expatriates), political speeches of Korean bureaucrats (and officials) on overseas Koreans, and several forum proceedings on the GKN. The discourse analysis of this research will be as follows. How does the discourse of the GKN imagine the overseas Korean national identity in the US context? What is the socio-economic and political background of the discourse? Second, I will also analyze the social production of hybrid subjectivity in Korean American women’s autobiographic writings. The analysis is aimed at illuminating the repressed and marginalized voices of Korean American women. Third, by conducting textual analysis, this paper investigates how Korean women’s ‘gender’ is conceived and constructed among Korean American women.

2. Diaspora space and women

This paper strategically conceptualizes Korean Americans as ‘diaspora’. It does so because the term is especially useful to elucidate what kinds of political, historical and geographic implications are internalized in the notion of migration. The concept of ‘diaspora’ is usually defined as ‘expatriate minority communities’ (Safran 1991), that are dispersed to multiple places, that contain collective myths about homeland or homing desire, that maintain a sense of exclusion from the host country, whose collective con-
sciousness and solidarity are defined by their relations with the homeland (Safran 1991; Clifford 1994; Vertovec 1997). As ‘diaspora’ presupposes cultural and epistemological ‘in-betweenness’ as well as spatial displacement (Clifford 1992; 1994), the diasporic community as an ‘imagined community’ internalizes multiple, simultaneous and ambivalent relations with the home country and the hosting society (Hall 1994; Siu 2001). And, these variable ‘relationalities’ in which diasporic community is imagined and constructed also resonates specific socio-economic conditions (Brah 1996; Mitchell 1997).

Based on the conceptualization of diaspora above, this paper considers Korean American communities as ‘diaspora space’. I operationally define it as a form of socio-spatial materialization of multiple diasporic relations. Diaspora space could be a strategic problematic to undermine descriptive and power-laden notions such as ‘ethnic enclave’, because it presupposes multiple socio-spatial relations that construct migrants’ social space as a ‘place’ (Anderson and Gale 1992; Duncan and Ley 1993). Therefore, diaspora space is located in a radical place for socialist, poststructural and postcolonial feminist geographers. It is so especially when we admit everything on the earth is essentially diasporic as well as hybrid. In this sense, the geography of diaspora space has epistemological priority (and immanence) not only to enrich discussion on the articulation of race, class, ethnicity, sexuality and gender, but also not to disregard the dynamic fluidity of social relations in terms of on-going mobility and cultural ambivalence. In the following section, I’ll discuss some of the accomplished and possible (and possibly crucial) feminist geographies of diaspora space in terms of socialist, post-structural and postcolonial feminist viewpoints.

First, in the US context, we can understand contemporary diasporic communities as a post-Fordist phenomenon related to the flexibilization and feminization of labor force since 1970s. Most of contemporary Asian immigrants since 1970s have been incorporated into the US economy as laborers in the process of post-Fordist economic restructuring, although there are also a considerable number of people who are self-employed as small-business entrepreneurs or employed in professional occupations (Soja 1989; Sassen 1999; Scott and Soja 1996). Ong et al. (1994) briefly enumerate some of socio-economic crises in the process of industrial restructuring; degradation of labor condition, corporate reorganization and innovation, surge of conservative ideology and new inequality.

One of the conspicuous characteristics in the US labor market since 1970s was a significant degree of segregation by gender. It subsequently produced many occupations that are predominantly divided as male work and female work. Through both economic and institutional mechanisms, the gender composition of occupation influenced wage levels associated with gender rather than personal performance or other structural characteristics. As a result, wage became falling as the proportion of female workers gradually increased.
Wage levels in un-skilled and semi-skilled manufacturing sphere have been kept low through this form of discrimination.

In this context, Asian women laborers were located in the center of flexibilization of the US labor force. They frequently entered into the lowest niche of the pyramid structure in these wage levels. Ong and Azores (1994) clearly showed the ways in which a large number of foreign-trained Filipino nurses have immigrated into the US during this period. In this process, Asian women became crucial labor resources in the US labor market. Thus, diaspora space has become inseparable from the process of what McDowell (1991b) call as ‘feminization of labor market’. Further, ethnic labor market vis-à-vis female labor market has been also related to the colonial and racial gaze of power, as seen in the case of stereotyping Asian male ‘and’ females as feminine, submissive and meek. It could be suggested that the strand of gender-segmented labor market cannot be separated from racial (ethnicity-based) labor market.

Although not precisely related to the feminization of segmented labor market in the US, massive Asian migrants and their small businesses have emerged also as visible economic actors of post-Fordist (or postmodern) urban spaces in the US. For example, Los Angeles during the period has experience a sheer expansion of its urban boundary. Initially, the peripheral suburban areas were converted from farms and ranches into bedroom communities for middle-income workers commuting to jobs in Los Angeles. By the 1980s, however, a series of urban studies reported the emergence of ‘exopolis’ or a set of new edge cities made up of high technology clusters, office centers, and retail emporia. These new economic spaces become scattered throughout the peripheral regions of metropolis (Soja 1989; Scott and Soja 1996; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996).

Subsequently, rapid suburbanization of middle-class communities, which urban geographers called as spatial restructuring, brought about a series of serious urban problems in the inner city of Los Angeles. Those problems included the moving-out (and closing) of shopping centers, deterioration of built-up environment, rising of informal urban economy, soaring-up of crime rates, and decrease in retail services for daily lives of non-white poor neighborhoods. Ironically, the deterioration and unstable transformation of urban spaces in the inner city became a ‘niche’ market for Asian immigrant entrepreneurs, especially for Korean entrepreneurs. In the inner city, rents for lands and buildings were very low. Also as there were few small businesses left, new Asian business owners could easily settle down without business competition. Yet, the inner city was a community of low income residents who were also potential customers for local small businesses.

Ignored in the tarnished ideological images of ‘model minority’ or ‘middleman minority’ (see Bell 1985) were the patriarchal, unequal gender relations of Korean migrants’ domestic sphere. In this sense, what McDowell (1991a) termed as capitalist-patriarchy
model could be an analytic tool to investigate gender relation in migrants’ family. Women’s gender role was expected as both housewife and mother, and simultaneously they were also crucial labor force for less wages in post-Fordist accumulation regime. The images (or ideological stigma) of Asian migrants as loyal, hard-working, patient and laborious ‘aliens’ were based on women’s multi-dimensionally marginalized suppression. Yet, it could be said that they were also a result of colonial white males’ desires, fantasy, and imagination. In other words, the ideological construction of Asian women could be an invention and abstraction of ethnic femininity. Yet, women’s voices in diaspora space are subsumed, oppressed and repressed under the name of diasporic (Korean) ‘nationalism’ and ‘ethnic’ minority (Kim and Choi 1998). In this sense, I suggest that the critique of economic restructuring in terms of gender roles and relations should be paralleled with the poststructuralist and postcolonialist feminist viewpoints on the geography of diaspora space.

In fact, European travel writings during the Victorian age were frequently connected deviant sexuality. As Anne McClintock (1995) puts it, colonial women’s bodies (and their lands) had become what can be called as a porno-tropics for the European imagination - “a fantastic magic lantern of mind onto which Europe projected its forbidden sexual desires and fears” (McClintock 1995: 22). If we admit that diasporic community is imagined, that imagination is always a certainly gendered practice. Further, gender is located in the central politics of (diasporic) nationalism. Therefore, as McClintock (1995: 385) suggests, “if nationalism is not transformed by an analysis of gender power, the nation-state will remain a repository of male hopes, male aspirations, and male privilege”.

In this context, Domosh’s (2002) recent analysis of race and gender has a plenty of implications on the geography of diaspora space. She suggests that the image of ‘civilized women’ was crucial in the nation-building process based on the discourse of civilization/savagery dualism. Civilized women were passive and delicate, and “they were the family’s caretakers, and the keepers of society’s morals and sentiments” (Domosh 2002: 186). And, Native Americans were depicted as “archaic, representatives of prehistory that are out of place in modern history” (Domosh 2002: 187-8). Their space was anachronistic space, which is ‘temporally different and irrevocably superannuated by history (Domosh 2002; see also McClintock 1995).

Based on the discussion above, we can theorize diaspora space in terms of the production of dominant discourses such as modernity, racism, nationalism and masculinity. Tien (1999), in his study of Chinatown in New York, analyzed the ways in which the use of Chinese things, ideas and people in the US has been instrumental in the imagination of US cultural identity. Lee (1999) also points out that Orientalism in the US had been constructed as a “third sex” (Lee 1999: 85) as Victorian bourgeois nuclear family (and
white, heterosexual, middle-class women) took its place as the social norm. And, based on his extensive analyses of visual archives and texts, Lee (1999) shows the ways in which Orientalism against Asian immigrants does still exist in American popular culture. Therefore, from the historico-geographic perspective, we can theorize diaspora space as a space of Orientalized “abjection” through which patriarchal/heterosexual normativity vis-à-vis unequal gender relation is constructed (Kristeva 1982; McClintock 1995).

However, it cannot be assumed that people in diaspora space don’t necessarily wait to be disciplined, Orientalized and culturally colonized. Yet, they are simultaneously (and sometimes actively) involved in the complicated practices of ‘colonial mimicry’ and resistance. In other words, diaspora space is not only orientalized by dominant discourse, but it is also internally orientalizing space in a broader scale of dominant discourses. According to Park’s (1997) anthropological research on androcentric discourses in Korean community, Korean American males frequently criticize a woman for speaking up or acting more assertively than she would in Korea. She quotes from a male interviewee that “women sound so ugly when they raise their voices. Probably they have learned something from American culture, but not in a proper way, only in their own distorted way” (Park 1997: 122). Park’s quote shows the ambivalence of colonial experiences in diaspora space. Her interviewee desires both for thinking of Americanness to learn, and for conserving patriarchal familial discourse formed in Korea. Such ambivalent desire operates for empowering Korean American’s male position to maintain patriarchal gender relation.

For the concluding remark, I would like to suggest that there is significant political space to be theorized in-between feminist geographers’ studies on capitalism and patriarchy, and poststructural/postcolonial feminists’ discourse analysis of race, gender and sexuality. In this sense, the geography of diaspora should be brought back in to enrich radical feminists’ politics.

3. Discourse of the “Global Korean Network”

In 1997, the South Korean government established the “Overseas Koreans Foundation (OKF)”, a non-profit organization funded and supported by the South Korean government. The South Korean national law legislated the primal goal of this organization as “to encourage and to support overseas Koreans for having national identity and their lives in their country of residence” (Overseas Koreans Foundation 1997; Park 2009). Based on this legislation, the OKF has generally initiated four broad projects. The first is to support the development of Korean diasporic communities. The second is to restore and to
maintain national culture and identity throughout Korean diaspora. The third is to construct inter-Korean networks over the global scale. And the fourth is to support researches and projects on overseas Koreans (Overseas Koreans Foundation 1997; Park 2009).

These four projects were basically grounded on the idealism that Korean nationals beyond spatial barriers will contribute to constructing peaceful international relations and communities within each nation-state. When the Korean Minister of Foreign Policy made a public speech on the global significance of Korean diaspora to celebrate the establishment of the OKF, he accentuated the common national heritage and brotherhood between Korean citizens and diasporic Koreans.

We, Koreans, have a population of 76 million [South Korea: 46 million, North Korea 30 million] on this globe. However, we have unfortunately forgot another 5.6 million overseas Koreans for a long time. … They [diasporic Koreans] are not only ‘Koreans’ like us, but they also have rich economic, political and cultural resources make our country [the South Korea] more competent in this global era. … Some of them are thriving, but some others are experiencing hardship that is destined to oppress minority in their host countries. We [South Koreans] should embrace all of them, regardless of differences in their historical, political and economic backgrounds. This [Networking diasporic Koreans] is not only a significant opportunity for us [South Koreans] to jump on the center of global stage, but also a historical mission or a responsibility given to ourselves.

(Overseas Koreans Foundation 1997: 5-6)

His remark clearly justifies the South Korean government’s intervention in diasporic Korean communities from historical perspective. The ideology of ‘common’ rootedness and historical memory conceals the ‘pure instrumentality’ of the nationalist discourse to appropriate “rich economic, political and cultural resources…in this global era” (Overseas Koreans Foundation, 1997, 5).

In 1998, the OKF initiated a long-term project called as the “Global Korean Network (GKN)”, which allegedly aimed to interlink Korean diasporic communities for sharing economic and cultural information pool. However, actually, the major and real objective of this project was to provide institutional and legislative efficiency and support for Korean-based transnational corporations, Korean investors and Korean business-owners. In so doing, the South Korean government wished the GKN to promote capital flows and increase flexibility of accumulation. This is especially related to the transition in economic environment in South Korea after the 1997 financial crisis. Through net-
working those Korean investors and business owners, the South Korean government tried not only to attract foreign investment and to secure foreign currencies, but also to promote Korean investment to overseas Korean communities. In the following section, I’ll examine how the transnational Korean nationalism of the GKN conceptualizes overseas Koreans including US Korean Americans.

First, the GKN involved a wide range of self-governmental diasporic institutions and organization. It included such actors as the Korean American Association in the US, the Mexico-resident Koreans’ Association, and the Korean Japanese Federation. By including diverse local actors, the South Korean government aimed to appropriate them as an ideological apparatus for dispersing Korean nationalism throughout diasporic communities. For this goal, the OKF provided a considerable amount of funds to those diasporic institutions. According to the Korean American Association, the amount of funds from South Korean government has recently increased about 60 percent annually since 1995. As a result, for example, Los Angeles ‘Koreatown’, which is one of the largest Korean diasporic communities in the world, has recently constructed Korean museum, Korean culture center and Korean language school, and organized annual festival for representing Korean culture and tradition. The followings are some of the regulation of the Federation of US Korean Associations, which shows transnational ties between South Koreans and Korean Americans.

The basic goal of the Federation is; to try and secure the rights and interests of the Korean national community, to contribute to flourishment of our fatherland by seeking the legal, economical and social improvement of the Korean immigrants who dwell in the United States of America, to preserve our traditional culture, to actualize our dreams for continued growth in this land through the activities which will facilitate our assembled capability by promoting the relationship of the Korean immigrants throughout the world.

(US Federation of Korean American Associations, author’s emphasis)

Although the regulation above shows a ‘hybridized’ position of the Korean American Associations between the US and South Korea, it essentially regards the diasporic subjects not as ‘hybridized subjects’ but as ‘Korean nationals’. This kind of transnational connection was led to constructing economic relation between South Korea and diasporic communities. For example, since the IMF-controlled economic system, Korean Japanese communities initiated a nation-wide civil movement to deposit or transfer their money into Korean-owned banks or to invest their money directly into South Korea. They are alleged to transfer about 500 million dollars into South Korean banks from 1998 to 1999
(Overseas Korean Foundation, 1999, 45). For another example, the Korean American Association in Los Angeles has constructed the Korean Culture Center in 1999 and renovated Korean Museum in 2001. According to a local newspaper (L.A. Chosun Ilbo, 2000, 11), the South Korean government’s and Korean-based corporations’ donations mostly funded these activities. These institutions work for producing Korean history, tradition and ‘identity’ for ‘educating’ second or third generations of Korean Americans (Abelmann and Lie, 1997). Although this kind of diasporic movement sometimes involves individual family network, it is notable that diasporic institutions are strongly engaged in reinforcing transnational ties between the South Korea and diasporic communities.

Second, in relation to transnational connection between diasporic institutions and South Korea above, the GKN was also involved in promoting South Korean investors to invest for developing those Korean diasporic communities. For example, it considered one of its primal sub-projects as the construction of the Korean Business Owners’ Network for promoting investment in South Asian countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines, and Latin American countries such as Brazil, Peru and Mexico. Through networking diasporic entrepreneurs in such regions, the OKF provided local information and justification for them. The information was not just related to geographic or historical introduction of those host countries, but also involved in outlining labor market, land rent, local taxes, locational advantages and so on (Global Korean Network 1998). One of proponent for the construction of global business network said in the interview with a Korean newspaper,

Transnational Korean businessmen are all civil, informal ambassadors. Through importing Korean goods from our country [the South Korea] and selling them to local people, we contribute to the enhancement of Korean national prestige. I’ve just really impressed by the South Korean government’s recent effort to construct information pool for overseas Korean business owners. It’s good. Not only for us, but also for all Koreans in the whole world.

(Hankyoreh 2001: 32)

However, it cannot be denied that the discourse of the GKN is also related to informing how diasporic Koreans have lived in foreign lands, and how they overcome various social discriminations and hardships. And, actually, there were some of small-sized civil movements among Koreans in Southeast Asia and Latin America to introduce those countries’ history or geography to other participants, because many of South Korean entrepreneurs were interested in making money from their businesses. For example,
during the forum of the GKN in 1998, a Korean entrepreneur in Brazil underlined how South Koreans have had a prejudice against Latin Americans.

I came from Brazil. I’ve lived there for about 25 years. … Although Koreans in Brazil have a 35-year-old long history, they don’t much about how many Koreans have lived in Brazil. Further, they are totally ignorant of the contemporary economic development and cultural history of Brazil. Brazilians are very kind and well-educated people, but Koreans generally regard Latin American countries including Brazil as fairly underdeveloped countries. Some of Korean business owners even despise and exploit their Brazilian employees. … I really feel shame at being Korean. You know, in this situation, you are talking about the so-called ‘Global Korean Network’. What is it for? What does the term of ‘Korean’ mean to us? How much do you understand that overseas Koreans are really concerned about identifying themselves as Koreans? … I don’t know what the Global Korean Network would be, but I’m sure that it should be based on understanding and contributing to local characteristics.

(Overseas Korean Foundation 1998: 62-63)

Although he regarded himself as a Korean, he was quite critical in pointing out that overseas Koreans mostly interested in ‘making money’ instead of contributing the dominant society in the country of residence like Brazil. However, I’d like to underline that recent neo-nationalism was more concerned with underlining diasporic Koreans’ economic success stories and their potential contribution to globalize South Korean economy.

Finally, the GKN also contributed to enhancing labor market flexibility in South Korea. Although there were substantially not so low rates of unemployment in South Korea after 1997 financial crisis, Korean Chinese in Northeastern China has rapidly immigrated into South Korea for searching for economic opportunity. As they work for companies and factories for a low wage, the South Korean government was not strict in regulating those immigration flows from China. In this sense, the proponents of the GKN underlined the national homogeneity (and sameness) between South Korean and Korean Chinese. And they suggested that South Korean government should be more open-minded in allowing those Korean Chinese to migrate into South Korea. However, they didn’t pay enough attention to social welfare, low wage, labor over-exploitation, residential problems and cultural marginalization, which Korean Chinese immigrants experienced in South Korea. The discourse of the GKN had a strong inclination to consider those diasporic subjects as ‘economic resources’ for developing South Korean capitalism from the nationalist perspective.
In sum, the discourse of the GKN was based on the South Korean government’s foreign policy and its nationalist imagination. From the political economic perspective, it is found out that the discourse and its discursive practice were primarily aimed at promoting economic flexibility in terms of labor force, financial flows, and foreign investment. South Korean nationalism, in this sense, functions as an ideological narrative for justifying and reinforcing the South Korean government’s strategy for constructing its flexible global capitalism. This could be hypothetically summarized as the ‘flexible nation-state’. The flexible nation state appropriates resources from the transnational social space. In so doing, it aims to minimize political-economic risk beyond the physical border of the nation-state. Diaspora space is not necessarily an alternative social space for ‘transnational migrants from below’ in the context of postcolonial politics. Rather it also could be aggressively appropriated by the nation-state and capitalists for their own economic benefit. Further, it was also found out that those nationalist narratives didn’t include diasporic women’s voices and other social differences within Korean American communities. There were Koreans, but there was no Korean American! Neither there were Korean American woman. The collective subjectivity in the GKN discourse was only associated with the ‘normative Korean ethnic identity’. In the second analysis of Korean American women’s personal writings, I investigate the way in which their subjectivity is hybridized, negotiated and socially constructed.

4. Subjectification in Korean American women’s writing

I chose two women’s articles in the journal of Korean Quarterly. The journal of Korean Quarterly is mostly written and read by US Korean Americans. In this sense, the category of “Korean American” could be clearly distinguished from the category of “Koreans in America”. In other words, the term “Korean American” has dualistic meanings; the first is Koreans who live in the US, and the second is Americans who are ethnically Korean. The first group is generally composed of first generations of Korean immigrants (entrepreneurs, investors and professionals) whose ‘mother’ tongue is usually Korean. The second group, which includes second (and 1.5) generations of Korean immigrants, adopted Koreans, and mixed-race Korean Americans, has been (not necessarily) generally excluded from the dominant US Korean communities. Generally, the second group is told to be politically liberal, because their political discussion is about Asian American politics, anti-racism, in-betwixt identity, and feminist critique on Korean American’s patriarchal culture. However, because the solidarity of most Korean American communities is based on strong diasporic Korean nationalism, the first generation of Korean American has
more or less conservative and predominant voice in the internal politics of Korean American communities. However, a significant number of the so-called 1.5 Korean American generations, who are mostly bilingual, are recently returning and participating in Korean American societies. Many 1.5 and second Korean American generations are under-represented in the US and frustrated by the ‘glass ceiling’ of socio-economic hierarchy.

In this sense, *Korean Quarterly* is a Korean American journal of which most contributors and readers are Americans who are ethnically Korean but speak in English. The reason this journal was chosen for analysis is to contrast the journal’s major voices with the discourse of Korean transnational nationalism that I addressed in the earlier part of this paper. In the journal, I chose two autobiographic essays written by Lauren Kim Bae and Andrea Lee respectively. Bae was adopted by a US white family, while Andrea Lee immigrated into the US with her parents. So their positions are slightly different. The textual analysis deconstructs the narrator’s subjective position and investigates how it maintains certain political tension with Korean transnational nationalism.

In her fascinating psychoanalysis of the relation between race and the symbolic-imaginary ‘white Oedipal family’, Heidi Nast (2000: 219) argued that “landscapes not only record conscious acts and intentions or articulable cultural beliefs and political ideologies, but also desire and emotion beyond logos”. She showed the ways in which the desire of heterosexual white Oedipal family constructed the real geography (such as black segregation in urban planning) in Chicago and various forms of political representation. Nast (2000) was sure that enslaved black males were ‘son and boy’ in a white Oedipal family. In this sense, migrant bodies and diasporic bodies could be also similarly conceived in regard to the country of origin (South Korea) and the hosting mainstream society (the US). For the empirical analysis, this paper mostly draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983; 1987) mapping of subject formation and its relation to the social in the context of migrant’s autobiographic narratives.

No sooner does a non-white migrant reach a white-dominating foreign land (e.g., the US territory) to live in than a migrant’ body is almost a ‘body without organs’ detached, disconnected from social flows (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). As Deleuze and Guattari suggests (1983), the body is composed of numerous functional machinic assemblages such as walking machine, eating machine, speaking machine, sleeping machine and so on. Like an infant ‘who sees the world for the first time in a fuzzy and noncoherent manner’ (Bae 1998), the social machines of migrant bodies have no belonging through which they could connect with other machines (or social-economic flows). It is located temporarily (and instantaneously) in the realm of ‘anti-production’ until his/her body is accepted to the various forms of social machines (e.g., employment, spending money, entering into
neighborhood and so on).

According to Deleuze and Guattari (1983), capitalism (or more exactly circulation of capital) intensively leads us to be an ‘individual (closed body)’, and incessantly demands us to reflect on ‘who I am’ (or identity) both in the production and reproduction sphere. A person’s name, family, ethnic identity, nationality, personality, intelligence and other personal attributes are produced by social and libidinal investment. The capitalist machine (and the state machine) is ironically becoming both the limit and the pre-condition of our bodily existence, because we are all dead body without social connection and flows in capitalism. There is no nomad who has no home, no name, no belonging and no social acceptance, within capitalism. Therefore, a migrant’s body disconnected from social flows in the realm of anti-production can only exist instantaneously.

This processual moment is exactly the same with Andrea Lee’s case when she was adopted at her five months by Caucasian parents. Andrea Lee mentions that her identity was racially ‘premeditated’. She was just an Asian (ethnic Korean) infant, but hadn’t embodied “Korean language and its culture” (Lee 1988). An infant has no rule except ‘and…and…and’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). Although frequently we call the chaotic behaviors of an infant as based on ‘curiosity’, everything that surrounds an infant is incessantly (and intensively) connectable and connected with infant’s (partial) desiring-machines with the rule of ‘and…and…and…’ until being disciplined in familial (and social) rules. In social scale it is exactly the same, because ‘there is no essential distinction (or difference) between the social and the familial’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983; 1987). The only difference between them is that the family is structured by the ideology of ‘Oedipalization’, which produces and is produced by the capitalist machine. In case of Andrea Lee, it is difficult to analyze the process of bodily social connections, because her writing doesn’t provide detailed information on her childhood, her Caucasian parents’ social status, neighborhood, childhood friendship and so on. However, her peer group in high school was mostly Korean Americans. We can raise a crucial question in this moment. As Lee asks to herself, “what effect did attending a predominantly Caucasian university have in developing my ‘desire’ to be among other Asians?” (Lee 1998) What social milieu produced her desire to associate with Korean American peers and to her heart-beating journey to making of her ethnic (or racial) identity? Her answer is that “the world is not color blind” (Lee 1998). It is “the social field of racial discourse” that produces desire, an active force based on social and material condition. Lee uses those terms of diasporic desire such as ‘belonging’, ‘acceptance’ and ‘comfort’. Where do they come from? In a different perspective, the poststructural geography (together with some studies of postcolonialist and feminist geography) has often considered the body as a vehicle or filter through which social structure embodies, reproduces and contests the
dominant notions such as identity, order, ethics and sexuality (Pile and Thrift 1995; Schatzki and Natter 1997). However, it is also significant to problematize to ask why there are differential geographies (and positions) of body. I argue that human subjectivity is ‘not’ unilaterally produced within the Foucauldian ‘factory’ of power-knowledge. Body is not a ‘docile and passive’ body awaiting to be disciplined. Rather, power is always a precondition to produce the active force, or the desire.

Lee’s initial social connections are recorded under the rule of ‘or…or…or…’. Among possibly numerous dualistic disjunctive recordings, Lee addresses some of the following recording processes; Am I a white or a non-white? Am I Korean or American? Am I an English-speaking Korean or a Korean-faced American? As the recording process is necessarily on the plane of racial power-discourse, it produces desires such as belonging, acceptance and comfort. In terms of Deleuze and Guttari (1983), the process inscribes those dichotomous ‘coordinates’ onto the surface of the body without organ, and produces desire within the body without organ. Lee denies her ethnic origin, and feels shameful in being Korean, but she cannot be accepted to the white friends. It is ‘premeditated’ to her existence. So, the diasporic (and hybrid) desire leads her to associate with Korean compatriots. However, among Korean American peers, she was “fake Korean” or “Twinkie” because she couldn’t speak Korean language and didn’t know the Korean cultural heritage. She locates herself neither belonged to ‘Americans’ nor to ‘Koreans’, which some postcolonial researchers celebratorily describe this kind of migrants’ experience (or position) in terms of hybridity, in-betweenness and ambivalence (for example, Appadurai 1994; Basch et al. 1994).

Lee’s instantaneous schizophrenic moment provides us for the possibility of liberation of being a body without organs. Identity, once a social construct possessed by powerful and ruling subjects to embody and inherit their political power (i.e., Asiatic political regimes), has now become a necessary ontological condition for human subjects on capitalist socio-political space through the process of modern deterritorialization. How can we become a social body without organs, disconnected from all of the capitalist social, economic and psychic production and reproduction (through identity)? However, Andrea Lee’s schizophrenia settled down with the consuming of her desires: she attended meetings of the Chicago Korean Youth Association; she became a member of the Asian Student Union; she was deeply involved in a Korean American church; she had a personal trip to South Korea; and she married a Korean American male. And, eventually, she’s got the last name of ‘Lee’, throwing out her former Caucasian name. She talks about “the power of ‘Lee’”, the repositioned space of resistance though it is a limited position in comparison to the liberational space (or ‘plateau’) of schizophrenia. Korean name empowers her (within Korean community), and provides a secure sense of Korean
identity. The processual formation of diasporic subjectivity, thus, involves the production of diaspora social space (or, Korean churches, communities, associations and other Korean ethnic groups in this case). And, therefore, Deleuze and Guttari (1987: 399) argue that “desire has nothing to do with a natural or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled, engineered desire.”

The case of Lauren Kim Bae’s writing is slightly different from Andrea Lee’s case, because Bae strategically identifies herself as a 1.5 generation Korean American embodied in a “unique” set of values that “bridges” both American and Korean culture. And, she constructs the ‘third’ (or ‘inbetwixt’) position through accepting dominant discourses such as East/West, true/false and traditional/modern binarism, development of identity formation, and the acceptance of ‘model minority’ ideology. For example, in the later part of the essay, she says:

My personal experiences and my work with Asian American teenagers have given me some insight into the issue of ethnic identity. Ethnic identity has been described by experts as consisting of stages. Individuals often progress from being in a diffuse/unidentified state, to exploration, and finally to resolution.

In terms of the primal moment of desiring-production process, unlike Andrea Lee’s case, Lauren Bae was brought up both in the Korean familial structure and in the broader US (especially white) cultural environment. It was initially ‘and…and…and…and…’ connection, and she was both American and Korean. However, as the recording process accompanies ‘or…or…or…’ process, her diasporic ‘mimicry’ to follow her white peer groups “in a fuzzy and noncoherent manner” was not acceptable to the master’s racial narration. She ‘desires’ to reject her ethnic background, but the skin color was irrefutable reality. So, Bae (1998) says,

Like other teenagers, I wanted to come to terms with my identity and find acceptance among my peers. … In the early years, I denied and rejected my Korean cultural heritage and became “Americanized”. It was not until I was in college and met other Korean Americans that I felt a true sense of belonging and identification with my cultural heritage.

However, her journey of desiring ‘secure sense of identity, belonging, acceptance and supportive milieu (all desiring-terms she uses in the essay)’ is between American and Korean. It is a dualistic journey between the American and the Korean, imprisoned in the broader structure of ‘national narrative as the master’s narration’ (Bhabha 1990). Her
desiring was immediately invested by libidinal socio-economic energy, which directly flows from her Korean network into her body (i.e., her Korean family, frequent visit of relatives from Korea). Therefore, it is difficult to find liberatory and radical schizophrenic moment in her reflective writing. However, again in regard to the resistance as ‘repositioned material effects’, her sense of identity provides with herself a third space (though it is politically limited) for the participation in Asian American communities and their politics. Bae, without raising the issue of unequal power relations, mentions that the best way to cope with the diasporic crisis of identity is to adopt a bicultural mode where Korean Americans can be fully functional in both cultural contexts. Therefore, for the author, the third space for politics is ‘the happy medium’ (Jung-Yong in Korean term) through compromising and switching of two cultures.

5. Conclusion

Recent ‘neo-nationalism’ in South Korea could be problematized as ‘transnational nationalism’ to appropriate global Korean diaspora space. In this sense, diaspora space is not necessary an exclusive space of migrants from below. Rather, the nation-state can also take the transnational social space to construct ‘flexible’ networks of capitalism in the context of globalization. In case of South Korea, I suggested that the recent nationalism functioned as an ideology to adjust South Korean national capitalism to global capitalism. Transnational Korean nationalism is not only limited to illuminate heterogeneity and hybridity in Korean American communities, but it simultaneously oppresses various differences within Korean diaspora space.

However, in terms of the textual analysis of two Korean American women’s writing, Korean American women’s voices were not well politically organized because women’s collective subjectivity is blurred and subsumed in national narratives. The absence of Korean women’s radical feminist voices seems resulted by discursive grids and “gendered” nature of transnational Korean nationalism.
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Across the disciplines of social sciences, diaspora has become the object of study to examine social, cultural and political relationships within and between groups. Understanding the transmutation of roots has led to the development of the current discourses of globalization in anthropology. There seems to be disagreements in interpreting the ways through which roots have become routes (Appadurai 1993, Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Clifford 1997 and Friedman 1994 and 2000) and the problematics are particularly in the differences in the interpretations of world history involved here. The process of ‘globalizing people’ has significant impacts in the transformation of economic, social and political processes between and within the countries. In the present globalized world, transnational migrations are significantly contributing to the economic development of migrants’ country of origin and the country of destination. Under globalization and liberalization process, the flow of remittance has been growing dramatically in some countries like China, Philippines, India, Mexico, Nigeria, and Bangladesh. This paper primarily discusses about the patterns and processes of ‘migration’ from Bangladesh and explores the empirically grounded linkage between global process and the production of network that are connected to the dynamics of global migration process.

**Key Words:** Globalization, Migration, Diaspora, Remittance and Bangladesh.
1. Introduction

The present article explores the potentials of establishing productive partnerships with Bangladeshi diaspora contributing to the social and economic development of their country of origin. The multiple roles of diaspora have drawn increasing recognition of the government and civil society organizations in Bangladesh in recent decades. Bangladeshi emigrant communities are not only senders of remittances, but also, they are investors, philanthropists, innovators, and lead the development of important economic sectors (Agunias and Newland 2012). Remittances are recognized as one of the most important sources of development finance, in recent times. Bangladesh Government’s engagement with diaspora communities has practical implications for enhancing these roles. The present paper has direct bearing upon policy making regarding diaspora and development in Bangladesh.

In this globalized world, millions of people live outside their country of origin. They have significant contributions to the economy of their country of origin. Despite the new restrictions after 9/11 and economic recessions in the USA, and the EU countries, flow of remittance has grown dramatically in some countries like China, Philippines, India, Mexico, and Bangladesh under globalization and liberalization. Using newly available census data, the stock of international migrants is estimated at 247 million in 2013, significantly larger than the previous estimate of 232 million, and is expected to surpass 250 million in 2015. Migrants’ remittances to developing countries are estimated to have reached $436 billion in 2014, a 4.4 percent increase over the 2013 level. All developing regions recorded positive growth except Europe and Central Asia (ECA), where remittance flows contracted due to the deterioration of the Russian economy and the depreciation of the ruble. In 2015, however, the growth of remittance flows to developing countries is expected to moderate sharply to 0.9 percent to $440 billion, led by a 12.7 percent decline in ECA and slowdown in East Asia and the Pacific, Middle-East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The positive impact on flows of a robust recovery in the US will be partially offset by continued weakness in Europe, the impact of lower oil prices on the Russian economy, the strengthening of the US dollar, and tighter immigration controls in many source countries for remittances. Remittance flows are expected to recover in 2016 to reach $479 billion by 2017, in line with the more positive global economic outlook (The World Bank, April, 2015). Such increase of flows is still very hard to track, as actual flows may be much higher.

Remittance flows to developing countries are estimated to total $351 billion in 2011, according to the latest issue of the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief (World Bank 2011). The present paper is about migration, diaspora and development
possibilities of remittances in Bangladesh. Remittances are defined as transfers of a sum of money that follow unidirectional paths from a migrant to his or her sending relatives and or friends, community, and country (Cohen 2011, Maimbo and Ratha 2005). Bangladeshi remittance practices tend to persist, even under unusual circumstances e.g. during recent global economic recession, because they are embedded in a moral economy of giving and sharing (Stevanovic, 2012). Stevanovic argues the triumph of moral economy embedded in family provision of care and support, kinship obligations, gender, and charity over economic motivations in understanding remittance practices of the Bangladeshi migrants (ibid). The idea of ‘social remittances’ by Levitt can be made relevant here to emphasize how ideas, behaviors and identities are transferred through diaspora communities’ engagement with their areas of origin (Levitt, 1999). Therefore, remittances cannot be understood by mere economic analysis because they are also social and inherently cultural. Remittances are embedded in social contexts and reflect cultural traditions of sending households and communities, the realities of the immigrants’ life, the migration process, and the reception by destination countries (Cohen J. 2011, Brettell 2003, Vertorec 1999). Complex social and cultural ties are reflected through remittances because they link sending and receiving communities (Cohen 2011, Brettell 2003, Vertorec 1999). In the context of Bangladesh, the moral values of remittances and associated obligations and expectations are highly significant in the persistence of remittance flows (Stevanovic, 2012).

2. Migration and Diasporas: Rootedness and Belongingness

To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul.

– Simone Weil

Academic studies have traditionally approached migration within a framework of economic development theory to understand the tendency of peoples’ movement from less developed to developed regions. These studies have focused on structural inequalities that drive people from less developed to more developed regions in search of employments. Recent studies shed light on the specifics of particular migrations as well as on the motives and experiences of those who move. Migrations in the current age of globalization exhibit different patterns from earlier migrations. For one thing, there seems to be a much greater diversification of types, motives, and networks. Often the same individual will shift from one type of migration to another over a single lifetime or even within a few
years (Shuval, 2000: 45). There are different reasons/causes behind the migration of people from one place to another place. According to Van Hear (1998), there are 1) root causes (colonial, post-colonial or close contiguity between countries of unequal development), ii) proximate causes (economic downturn, ecological devastation, or long term political turmoil) and iii) intervening causes (migration networks, available transportation, supportive organization and the like).

This intense focus on the meaning of migrants’ place of origin, defined by the nation state where they or their ancestors were born and grew up, is reflected in some of the recent theories on transnationalism and diasporic relations. Migrants often continue to regard their place of origin as an important social, cultural, economic and political ‘place of belonging’ (Eriksen, 2003: 66-7). There is every reason to examine the role of place as of belonging and identification in the increasingly globalized world. We are just beginning to understand the nature of global places and the complex ways in which they may be culturally constructed in different social, economic and political contexts (Eriksen, 2003: 75).

It is said that globalization has increased both disparities in income and human security between north and south and has emerged as an instrument for reducing global inequality and enhancing development. Economic liberalization, the entry of multinationals into formerly closed areas of national economies, and structural-adjustment policies are all instruments of social transformation, while the global media and electronic communications are idealizing images of northern lifestyles into the poorest villages and allowing easy access to information on migration routes and work opportunities. Long-distance travel has become cheaper and more accessible. Strong ‘migration networks’ established through various flows of migration help many people to find the migration route and to stay with families in the country of destination.

3. Migration from Bangladesh: Temporalities and Trajectories

It is really difficult to tell when migration exactly started from Bangladesh to foreign countries. But it is known that as elsewhere in South Asia, Bengal has been involved in overseas migration for hundreds of years (see Visram, 1986). Seventeenth century records tell of East India Company nabobs (nobabs) returning to Britain with Bengali servants, and from the earliest days of the company’s operations, lascars (Indian sailors) were employed by British ship docked in Calcutta. By the late eighteenth century the problem of stranded Indian lascars in London was sufficient to cause public concerns (Fryer, 1984: 79). The lascars invariably performed the most unpleasant tasks on the ships, with far
lower wages than their British counterparts. These sailors came from all over East Bengal, but especially from Chittagong, Noakhali, and Sylhet. These men were the first of millions of South Asians to be drawn into the global labor market, be this through indentured labor to British territories in the nineteenth century (see Clarke et al., 1990; Wolf, 1982: 368-70), the recruitment of Indians to the British army and navy during the Raj, or the use of Commonwealth labor by British industry after the Second World War. The *lascars* were the first pioneers to tread a path which by the latter part of the twentieth century was to link particular districts closely to Britain through the international labor market. Once these links were established, their influence would increasingly dominate such areas. In East Bengal, it was Sylhet that became especially bonded to Britain, for although East India Company *lascars* were originally from many parts of Bengal; by the mid twentieth century Sylhetis had slowly begun to monopolize employment (Gardner, 1995: 36).

As we have mentioned above that from the earliest days of the East India Company, Bengali people (men) employed as servants and ship-workers were arriving in Britain. Whilst the numbers of such migrants were small over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by the early twentieth century the demand for labor began to grow. Already, the paths to employment were partly established: would be *lascars* came predominantly from areas where people already had contacts. For those in coastal areas such as Noakhali and Chittagong districts there was already an established tradition of men working as sailors: these were obvious recruits for ships calling at Chittagong. Sylhet, several hundred miles from the Bay of Bengal, had also link with Calcutta as an exception (see Gardner, 1995: 39).

Gardner (1995) mentioned that for many people (men) in Bangladesh, working as sailor was only the first stage in their travel. The ships went all over the world: to the Far East, Australia, America, Europe, and Britain. Once they had docked, particularly in London and New York, many Sylhetis ‘jumped ship’, stealing away from their boats and disappearing on to dry land, where they would hopefully locate friends or fellow countrymen to help them to find work and accommodation. Individual men were key importance in providing a base for their incoming countrymen. Through this process, it was not until the early 1960s that more widespread migration developed. During that time whilst many men were working hard for their families in Britain; others had begun to migrate to the Middle East. This trend began later, in the 1970s, and was directly related to the boom in oil prices in 1974, which led to the expansion of Middle Eastern economies and the large-scale creation of new job opportunities. Men from all over the world have been recruited to the Middle East; at the bottom of the pile, in terms of working conditions, security, and pay, are South Asian (also see, Owens, 1985: 12).
4. Persistent Remittance Flows: Bangladeshi Diaspora and Remittance

Remittances have played an increasingly important role in the national economy of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is now 8th of the top 10 remittance receiving countries, which received $15 billion in remittance in fiscal year 2014-15 and expected to receive more in remittance this fiscal year (2015-2016) to make it the seventh highest remittance receiving country, according to the World Bank (See Figure 1 and Figure 2). Although at a more moderate pace, the growth trend showed remarkable resilience in the face of the recent global economic recession. Remittances are now competing with the RMG industry as the largest source of foreign currency earnings for Bangladesh economy and are higher than net foreign direct investment (FDI). Country's 8.5 percent remittance growth this year is the highest in South Asia, as the regional average is 4.5 percent. Since the 1990s Bangladeshis have also become a notable part of the international labor migrant pool in a number of Southeast Asian and East Asian countries. About 10 million Bangladeshis are now scattered in some 157 countries and they have high reputation as

![Figure 1](image-url)  
*Figure 1. Number of Persons Left for Abroad on Employment and Total Workers’ Remittances from 1877 to 2015.*
hard-working and good-natured people. International labor migration from Bangladesh started during the 1970s due to the increase in labor demand from Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which subsequently expanded to other parts of the world. Bangladeshi migrants include professional, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Most of these migrants belong to the category of less skilled and semiskilled laborer. Compare to the migrants of other countries, Bangladeshis are low paid and engaged in odd jobs. In most cases, they work and live in a poor environmental condition and often do not get workplace agreement done. Many of them work in a condition, where human rights, rules and obligations are violated.

Bangladesh is an exporter of professional, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers to more than 22 countries. Saudi Arabia remains the largest importer of workers from Bangladesh, accounting for the lion's share of total workers who went abroad during the 1976-2015 period. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Malaysia are the other two important destinations for Bangladeshi workers. Bangladeshi migrants are also working in the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, New Zealand, Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, Japan, Mauritius, Jordan and Lebanon (See Table 1). However, most of the human resources sent by Bangladesh are in the category of less skilled and semiskilled category.

Remittances are coming through the formal and the informal sector. The formal sector refers to authorized money service providers and includes three main channels: Banks, Global Networks, and Country Specific Operators. The global networks can transfer

![Figure 2. Bangladesh is one of the Top Recipients of Migrant Remittances in 2014.](image-url)
small or large amounts of money to remote places around the world speedily sometimes within minutes and for this service they charge a fee. Often these fees are substantially higher than bank transfer charges. The cost of transferring monies to developing countries has long been cited as a burden to those migrants sending money home to their families. Country specific operators transfer money using a distribution network in their home country.

| Table 1. Number of Bangladeshi immigrants in industrialized countries. |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| **Country** | **Number of Bangladeshi Immigrant** |
| UK | 500,000 |
| USA | 500,000 |
| Italy | 70,000 |
| Canada | 35,000 |
| Japan | 22,000 |
| Australia | 15,000 |
| Greece | 11,000 |
| Spain | 7,000 |
| Germany | 5,000 |
| South Africa | 4,000 |
| France | 3,500 |
| Netherlands | 2,500 |
| Belgium | 2,000 |
| Switzerland | 1,400 |
| **Total** | **1,178,400** |


For a number of reasons, including cost, remittances are often made outside the formal sector, informally, by sending money home in cash with friends or relatives or through a system that has various names such as *hawala* originating in the Middle East, or *chop*, *chit* or *flying money system* originating in China. In the chit system a migrant who wants to send money home may contact someone at a shop/business locally who will take the cash and enter the transaction in a ledger book. This business makes a phone call to another business in the city and country of the recipient. The migrant contacts the recipient who goes to collect the money. There is no paper work and no physical transfer of money. This method is now a major remittance system around the world operating wholly outside the formal financial system and relies on trust and the extensive use of
connections such as family or regional affiliations (see McCarthy, 2009).

Now a day, migrants of Bangladesh are sending more money through official channels after a crackdown on hundi and hawala networks of informal money sending after 9-11 (De Bruyn and Kuddus, 2005:27). Official channels for sending remittances are through demand drafts issued by banks or exchange houses, traveler’s cheques, telegraphic transfers, postal orders, account transfers, automatic teller machine (ATM) facilities and electronic transfers. All these methods involve banking institutions, leave official records of the transaction and have commission costs. Studies put the figure sent through unofficial channels at between twenty and fifty percent (De Bruyn and Kuddus, 2005).

Remittance flows primarily from migrant workers in the Middle East, Europe and the US have been one of the standout successes of economic development of Bangladesh and continue to make an invaluable contribution in excess of $15 billion per year (including unofficial flows). There is little doubt that this can be expanded further with more focused skill development programs. But it is believed that there are important objectives beyond maximizing the volume of remittances rather focusing on developing a strategy to unlock the hidden potential of the Bangladeshi migrants in areas such as knowledge transfer and greater FDI (foreign direct investment). Bangladesh, being a labor surplus country, with above average work ethics, has the potential to become a key global player as a source country for the supply of less skilled human resources to developed countries. Policies should also focus on availing the benefits of increased demand for skilled workers in the new and emerging markets. Benefiting from the Bangladesh’s better relationship with the Muslim world, overall space acquisition of the East European and some rich African countries, having effective bi-lateral negotiations between the governments, providing loans or financial support to the migrating workers, further deepening of the capacity building approaches through Gob-NGO (Government of Bangladesh-Non-Government Organizations) linkages and overall improvement in inward remittance management space would be some of the important issues to be addressed. Managing the flow of workers through maximizing the outflow of workers and increasing inflow of remittances would be an important strategy for our poverty reduction (see Rashid, 2011). An effort must be simultaneously made by government to bring more remittance through legal channels. The proportion of savings sent through hundi needs to be further reduced by introducing incentives for money to be sent through formal channels. This could immediately add another $10 billion to the national coffer.
5. Remittance, Foreign Reserves and Bangladesh Economy

Remittance inflows to Bangladesh have been crucial in stabilizing the current account surplus, despite a significant trade deficit (World Bank 2010). Globally there are estimated to be 250 million migrants generating remittances of in excess of $440 billion annually and is expected that it would be 4479 billion in the year 2017 (World Bank 2015). World Bank data report that in 2010, Bangladesh ranked second to India ($55.0 bn) as the top remittance recipients in South Asia, with $11.1 billion and even precedes Pakistan ($9.4 bn). Remittances are extremely important to several regional countries: remittances to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh exceeded 6 percent of GDP and 75 percent of reserves in 2013 (See Figure 3). With remittance flows of around $70.4 billion in 2014, India remains the world’s largest remittance recipient country (World Bank 2015). According to a recent study by the World Bank (2015), remittance has helped reduce the poverty level in Bangladesh by 1.5 percent. It also accounts for about 66 percent of the country’s foreign currency reserves, providing Bangladesh with a strong and stable external position.

The total value of remittances could be fifty percent higher than official estimates depending on the country or region. Migrant remittances are estimated to be three times official development aid and are second only to foreign direct investment as a capital flow into developing countries. These flows of human and financial capital have profound implications for the economies and societies of the sending and the receiving countries.

Figure 3. Remittances to South Asian Countries are Large Relative to GDP and International Reserves
Remittances have enormous potential to contribute towards poverty reduction and economic development. Evidence exists that they impact on transient poverty, but the impacts on long term economic development are for the most part not known (UNCTAD 2004). At a country level those that receive remittance income are better off and poverty levels are less severe than those that don’t (UNCTAD 2004).

Despite the global financial meltdown, remittances by Bangladeshis abroad, one of the country’s economic mainstays crossed the US$ 15 billion in 2014-2015. Bangladesh remains 8th position in remittance earning in the world next to Pakistan (See, Diagram: 1). The buoyancy of remittances during 2014-2015 has mainly taken place in view of the rise in the number of short-term migrants to Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Libya, Bahrain, Iran, and to Asian countries such as Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Brunei. There are predictions that by the year 2020, Bangladesh can earn an annually US$30 billion as remittances given the new job markets are explored, migrant workers’ skills are enhanced, and remittances are sent through official channels. According to Bangladesh Bank statistics, the remittances made by Bangladeshi expatriates abroad in 2015 were estimated at $15 billion, up from $6.55 billion in 2007.

International remittances are sent mainly by three large, but distinct types of migrant. Firstly, there is an important, mainly American and British, diaspora of well-educated, high or middle income earners. Countries such as Australia and Canada have similar, smaller and more recently arrived diaspora groups. Secondly, a diaspora of Bangladeshi origin belonging to the low-income or unemployed segments of the population also exists in industrialized countries. Thirdly, there is a major group of migrant laborers, who are residing for a specific period of time in Middle Eastern (mainly Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait), South-East Asian (Malaysia, Singapore) and some industrialized countries (See De Bruyn & Kuddus, 2005).

Traditionally though, ‘diaspora migrants’ remit less, as they have fewer ties with Bangladesh, many of them are now second generation migrants and often have their families living with them and business interests in the host countries (De Bruyn, and Kuddus, 2005:31). Migration of skilled people or more appropriately diaspora migration was once seen as ‘brain drain’. But over the years researchers have shown that diaspora population of many countries have contributed to the development of their country of origin by sharing knowledge, skill and technology which they acquired in the country of destinations and it is now considered as ‘brain gain’ for the country of origin.

There are about 1.5 million people in Bangladeshi diaspora in UK and USA, Greece, Italy, Canada, Australia etc. The most established, long term Bangladeshi communities are in the UK and USA. In these countries the communities are divided between Bangladeshi
citizens and naturalized immigrants or second generation citizens. This community can be divided into two groups: one is highly skilled immigrants or naturalized students who have arrived recently and the other one is longer established communities, often drawn from rural, relatively poorly educated groups such as the Sylheti community in the UK.

The other main flow of migration to the US, UK, Canada and Australia is of student migration. Relatively rich and well educated Bangladeshis go to these countries to study at the universities. In the USA and Australia it is sometimes possible to get citizenship or a work permit after graduation. This makes studying in those countries highly attractive, although out of the reach, economically and academically, of the vast majority of Bangladeshis. Many European countries and East Asian countries such as Japan and Korea also have Bangladeshi communities. These are comprised of a mixture of irregular migrants and regularized migrants. For this reason, and a lack of data on even the regular migrants, it is very difficult to find out the exact numbers. Recent research conducted in Madrid indicates that as time goes on, the regularization programs in Spain continue and the Bangladeshi community in Spain becomes more settled, the number is sure to grow (Zeitlyn, 2006). The Bangladeshi community in Italy has grown enormously in the last few decades, and has led to increasing business ties between the two counties and a settled Bangladeshi community in Italy. This, in turn is fuelling more migration there, both through official channels and through irregular, illegal channels, which are both encouraged by an already existent community.

The world's largest Bangladeshi migrant population is in Saudi Arabia, where there are more than a million. There are also significant diaspora populations in the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, where Bangladeshis are mainly classified as foreign workers. The United Kingdom's 2001 census found 300,000 British Bangladeshi mainly concentrated in east London (Tower Hamlets and Newham). The migration to Britain is mainly linked with chain migration from the Sylhet region (95% of population). Besides the UK and Middle East, Bangladeshis also have a significant presence in the United States, mainly in New York (where many are also from Sylhet and other regions), in Far Eastern countries such as Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, and in other Western countries such as Italy, Canada, Australia. Among them, there are a growing number of achievers in various fields. From teaching to technology and from designing to business they are supporting diverse societies and communities speaking alien languages and adopting to different cultures. Long-term migrant communities of Bangladeshi origin are also making important contributions to the development of Bangladesh, especially in terms of remittances. This remittance contributes significantly to the national economy. The impact at the household level is less straightforward. On the plus side, remittances allow families to meet their
basic needs; open up opportunities for investing in education, health care, etc.; loosen up constraints in the family budget to invest in business or to save; are a kind of emergency resource; provide a social security for the elderly; and can boost the local economy (De Bruyn & Kuddus, 2005). Remittance sent by more than eight million migrant workers plays a crucial role in the country’s economy, helping reduce the overall incidence of poverty as well as maintaining a healthy balance of payments.

Some keys to success for Bangladesh to replicate the effectiveness of its migration strategies include:

- Developing adequate institutional structures and mechanisms for capturing benefits from the increased global labor market;
- Measures should be taken to make the recruiting agencies accountable, while they can also be rewarded for their performance (RMMRU, 2010);
- Bank in collaboration with non-government organization (working at the grassroots) should provide specialized loans to the migrant workers at a low interest rate (RMMRU, 2010);
- Raising the issues of short-term labor migration in various trade and economic cooperation agreements to pursue more overseas employment;
- Bi-lateral agreements to increase the benefits of temporary movements of labor for countries of origin through greater certainty of access and enabling conditions. Such agreements can ensure that credentials of migrant workers are accepted in the destination countries;
- Better knowledge and enhanced capacities in different policy areas are essential to ensure the protection of migrants, the facilitation of legal migration, the integration of migrants into the country of destination, the support for sustainable voluntary return and the greater interlinking between migration and development (IOM, World Migration Report, 2010);
- Gathering more information on demand for labor in various sectors in destination countries, and adequate bargaining to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment;
- Provisioning more monitoring for effective migration management;
- Adopting policies concerning labor outflows, education, training, capacity building, remittances and protection of interests of workers (see Rashid, 2011, Siddique, 2010), and
- Taking necessary measures to utilize the skills of returnee migrants by employing them in appropriate works (Khondoker, 2010).
- Introducing more categories of investment bonds for our Diaspora to encourage them to invest more in new industries.
- Allowing diaspora to float credible investment companies which will hire professionals to use their funds and build industries.
6. Diaspora and Remittance: Prospects and Potentials for Bangladesh

Bangladesh is facing a number of big challenges ensuring a wider global market for its increasing number of young and dividend population. The rich world is now ageing, while the poor world like Bangladesh and India has a rising share of the young. Although the poor world is converging, growing more rapidly than in the past, it is still not able to create adequate employment opportunities for the increasing young population. The recent events in the Middle East bear out the latter proposition. In this situation, Bangladesh has a great opportunity to seize benefits of 'demographic dividend' of work force (15-59 years age) for at least 16 more years as there will be an acceleration in numbers of elderly people (60 years and above) after 2031. The period till 2031 represents the optimum time for investing in human resources and establishing other enabling conditions for economic growth in Bangladesh. Such a scenario helps a country to cut spending on dependents and spur economic growth. "Taking advantage of the ‘demographic dividend’ is an urgent imperative for Bangladesh. The dividend is not automatic; it is achieved only if the appropriate policies and development strategies are pursued," (General Economics Division (GED) of the Planning Commission prepared the 'Demographic Impact Study' (DIS), 2015).

It is clear that Bangladesh, as a country of dividend population, has a great potential for attracting the global labor markets. Increasing globalization and transnational migration will have major economic, social and cultural impacts in Bangladesh, if it can fulfill both professional and skilled labor migration’s conditions and requirements of different countries. Bangladesh, which wants to be middle income country by 2020, needs to bring some fundamental changes in its migration policy and planning approaches. It is also important to understand how globalization has paved the way for Bangladesh to connect itself with the processes of development and to examine the role of governments, international agencies, the private sector and civil society in responding to the challenges and tapping the opportunities of international demand of the labor force. A framework for assessing the role of migration for the development in Bangladesh should address the following issues (See Figure 4):
7. Conclusion

As a significant player of global labor market, Bangladesh needs to address the issues of migrant’s right, fair wage, long work permit, permanent residency, racism, discrimination, harassment and xenophobic violence. Diplomatic assistance for both permanent and temporary (skilled and unskilled labor) migrant workers in different countries and initiatives for finding new migration destinations, and developing more educated, skilled and country specific demand oriented technical laborers are also
important for increasing global labor migration and ensuring higher remittance flow. Branding and showcasing Bangladesh in the global labor market through education, language training, exchanging cultural and business delegation between the country of origin and the country of destinations and organizing more trade and export fairs in different countries will help to raise the image of Bangladesh and create better positions for Bangladeshi migrants and diaspora in their country of destinations. The government of Bangladesh also needs to take measures for creating positive scopes and environments for engaging Bangladeshi overseas people and diaspora in a major way for large scale foreign investment in Bangladesh through various ways for ensuring the significant contribution of diaspora for its development.
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The Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade in the Spanish Philippines and the Appearance and Role of the Chinese

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Chinese merchants temporarily stayed before the Philippines became a Spanish colony, but as the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade began, they positively intervened with silk and stayed long. This study analyzes how Chinese immigrants appeared and how dramatically they responded and settled during the Manila galleon trade period from 1571 to 1815.

The Manila galleon trade organized 2 galleons every year (1 galleon later) from Manila of the Spanish East Indies (the Philippines) to New Spanish Acapulco. This trade route was pioneered by missionary Andrés de Urdaneta in 1565 and was maintained until 1815 when Mexico became independent; however, this route became the first global sea road connecting Asia, America and the European Continent.

The Manila galleon trade developed as global trade as the Chinese silk was traded with the Spanish American silver. This study will investigate the Manila galleon trade and the Chinese’ appearance and role in the Philippines during the Spanish Colonial Era.

Keywords: Manila galleon trade, Chinese silk and Spanish silver, Chinese Immigrants, Chinese merchants, Spanish colony

1. Introduction

When we study Southeast Asia, we find something in common: they experienced colony (except for Thailand); in all Southeast countries (including Thailand) are the ethnic Chinese. Of course, they are not the pure Chinese but the Chinese mestizo, half-local and half-Chinese.

The ethnic Chinese community today belongs to the economically most influential group in the world. It goes without saying that the Chinese immigrants and their descendants are especially the most important beings in the Southeast economy and the powerful group. This example is also applied to the Philippines, that it is said 1.5% of the ethnic Chinese possess 74% of the total sales of top 1,000 companies in the wholesale and retail business,
and have 50% of economic power in the domestic capital (Nobert Dannhaeuser, 2004: 237).

As mentioned above, the fact that the ethnic Chinese composing a lot of the upper class over the middle class exist as the by-product of colonization, which had appeared because the Philippines was a Spanish colony, was recognized as an authorized theory, but it is also an established theory that there has been no viewpoint of considering the then Philippines as the global economic system.

Appearance of the Chinese in the Philippines during the Spanish colonial Era is unique. Manila, which became the capital of the Philippines after the Spanish conquest over Manila, had developed as a hub of the world trade since then, and the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade (the Manila galleon trade), which connected Manila to Acapulco, Mexico, led to the global economic system in which Chinese silk was exchanged with silver of the Spanish American colonies due to appearance of the Chinese; this is recognized as the first stage of the global trade (Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, 1995:201-221). The Manila galleon trade was made between the Spanish colony Manila and Nueva Espana (Mexico); however, as silk was delivered to the metropolitan Spain through the Spanish American colony via Manila from Fujian, China, and the Spanish American silver led to China through Manila, the trade already developed as a form of triangular trade (Chuan Hang-Sheng, 1969:61-75).

However, the main agent of the silk trade appearing in the triangular trade is the Chinese. In other words, as the Spanish Manila became a hub of the silk and silver trade in the 16th century called the trade period and Chinese junks from Fujian in China appeared, Chinese merchants began to stay in the Spanish Manila.

Moreover, the supply of all commodities, people, products, trade and services necessary for daily life in then Manila relied on the trade of Chinese merchants from Fujian, and people, articles (silk) and money (silver) became global in the 16th century connecting 3 continents — Asia, America and Europe.

This study will investigate backgrounds of the Chinese' settlement in the Philippines, focused on backgrounds of appearance of the Manila galleon trade in the Philippines, backgrounds of silk export and silver import of China, silver export and silk import of Nueva Espana (New Spain).

For this, this study is composed as follows: the second chapter will investigate the range and methods of this study and definitions of overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese; the third chapter will analyze the trade relationship between the Philippines before the Spanish colony and the Chinese; the fourth chapter will study backgrounds of the birth of the Manila galleon trade trading silver and silk, production of Spanish colonial American silver, and Chinese silk trade; the fifth chapter will examine the Manila galleon trade and
the appearance and role of the Chinese; the sixth chapter will summarize and conclude this study.

2. Precedent Studies and Research Methods

The Philippines did not have attractive resources to the extent that it was described as profitless archipelago in the 16th and 17th centuries (Leslie E. Bauzon, 1970:172) as it did not produce gold and silver as well as spice, but the Philippine government strategically settled Manila as the entrepot trade port of the same Spanish colony South American silver and Chinese silk; the Manila galleon trade appeared as the follow-up measure for this.

The Manila-Acapulco trade made between the 16th and 17th centuries, which was the period of the late Chinese Ming and the early Qing Dynasties, developed in accordance with Chinese demand for silver, Spanish colony South American silver production and metropolitan Spanish consumer sentiment of silk (Chuan Han-Sheng, 1975; Charles Boxer, 1958). Of course, the Manila galleon silk trade astonished the world as the silk was delivered to Europe through Spain, and mass movement of silk is called the marine Silk Road, unlike the land Silk Road. The answer of how this marine Silk Road was connected to Europe was silk and silver (Debin Ma, 1999).

On the other hand, the seaborne trade of Fujian merchants, who brought silk to Manila in the middle of Chinese Ming, made the role of the Chinese big in the Philippine economy during the period of the Manila galleon trade. Especially, as the role of Manila galleon through silk began to be greatly recognized, settlement of Chinese merchants gradually increased (Ng Chin-keong, 1971; Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo, 1996:206).

The appearance of the Chinese in the Philippines during the period of the Manila galleon trade, that is, the Spanish colonial era, was crucial even to the Philippine history. Wickberg (Edgar Wickberg, 1964:62-100) considered the Philippines under the Spanish colonial rule from the perspective of the world system theory, and highly regarded their roles considering the ethnic Chinese (Chinese mestizos), the important beings in charge of social transformation in colonies, as the special Filipinos.

However, the increase in the number of the Chinese, who settled in Manila before being recognized as the special Filipinos, was recognized by the Spanish government as the Chinese threat, which led to several times massacres of the Chinese by the Spanish government from 1603 to 1686 (Guillermo Ruiz-Stovel, 2009:47-63).

However, there are not many studies on what incidents and policies had these settle in the Philippine society through this persecution. Yu In-seon (1990:321) and Ikehada (1970:
48) pointed out the Spanish Philippine government ordered deportation to the Chinese three times to block the Chinese expansion of commercial supremacy.

Focusing on the above subjects, this study aims to review the Spanish Philippine government's policy focused on the correlation with the Manila galleon trade and to investigate how the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade, the first subject of this study, developed and why the Chinese appeared in the Manila galleon trade; the second subject of this study is to examine through what policies and incidents the Chinese settled in the Philippines after the persecution of the Chinese, as a lot of the Chinese appeared in Manila.

This study will investigate the process that the Chinese, who appeared for economic reasons between the Spanish and the Indio(Philippine natives) in the Manila galleon trade, settled as the special Filipinos(Chinese mestizo) as adapting to the Philippine society in the Spanish colonial era (Figure 1).

![Figure 1. The Chinese Appearing during the Galleon Trade Period](image)

Studying on the Chinese appearing in this study, definitions of overseas Chinese, ethnic Chinese and Chinese mestizo are necessary. According to the usually used definition of Chinese communist government of the People's Republic of China, the overseas Chinese refers to the Chinese people who emigrated to the states or areas other than Chinese continent, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao and live there with Chinese nationality. According to this definition, overseas Chinese implies they are temporarily out of the country but will return to China someday (Yuan-li Wu and Chun-hsi Wu, 1980: 7-10). Compared to this, the ethnic Chinese refers to the Chinese residents who acquired the nationality of the domiciled country. That is, they are distinguished from the overseas Chinese who do not acquire the nationality of the domiciled country (Hiroaki Kani, Yoshinobu Shiha, Chukun Yuu edition, 2002). That is, the overseas Chinese refers to immigrants who have Chinese nationality, while the ethnic Chinese descendants of the Chinese immigrants (Masanori kobayashi, 2013; 98).
Chinese mestizos (Mestizo de Sanglay or Chinese mestizo) appearing in this study are the descendants of Chinese immigrants who acquired the Philippine nationality according to the definition of Chinese communist government, so it will be used with the definition of the ethnic Chinese.

3. Manila Galleon: Trade of Silver and Silk

Who made the Philippines known to Europe first was Ferdinand Magellan, Portuguese navigator, who was supported by the Spanish royal family to leave for the round-the-world tour. Miguel López de Legazpi, who had newly appeared since Magellan landed in the Samar Island of the Philippines in 1521, succeeded in dominating most of the Barangay chiefs in 1566. And in Bisayas and Luzon were the first Spanish Southeast Asian colonized settlements built under the 'Catholic Cross'.

Named after the then Spanish king Felipe II, the name of the country of this island was decided as Philippines, and a governor was appointed in Manila; since then, the colonial rule for 328 years had begun.

Legazpi was appointed the first Philippine governor (1565-72). However, spices and precious mineral resources such as gold and silver that Spain expected were not found in the Philippines. Therefore, Spanish Manila government could not cover the cost of Catholic propagation, expedition and war only with tax collection by the colonial rule. In this situation, what supported Spanish activities economically was the Manila galleon trade, following the Manila-Acapulco (Setsuho Ikehata edition, 1999:100).

The galleon trade period (1565-1815) in the Philippine Islands under the Spanish colonial rule was a period when goods of East and West crisscrossed to the extent that it was recognized as the birth of the international trade. Especially, Chinese commercial activities and settlement in this period are also deeply related with appearance of Chinese mestizos later. Moreover, the interests and conflicts of the Spanish government of Manila and Chinese merchants in this period can be different.

The Manila Galleon trade started in 1565 and continued until 1815, for 250 years; 2 galleons were organized every year (later 1 galleon); it made considerable profit for Spain (Teiichi Ito, 1992:168). In spite of the short incumbency, Manila governors could accumulate considerable wealth as the shipowners of Manila-Acapulco trade galleons and administrative officers who distributed trade rights to merchants.

In 1565, San Pedro (or, San Pablo), which is recognized as the early pioneer ship of the Manila galleon, first left for Nueva Espana (New Spain) of Mexico, loading spices including cinnamon. However, it was not much welcomed; 6 years later, in 1571, as the
capital of the Philippines was moved from Cebu to Manila of Luzon, Chinese silk began to be considered the main product, and the Manila galleon trade led to the international trade (Thomas Baker, 2004:16).

Moreover, that missionary Andrés de Urdaneta sailed up to the northern Pacific (39 degrees 30 minutes north latitude), arrived in Acapulco, Mexico, in 3 and a half months by the westerlies and found the east route of Manila galleon played a crucial role of connecting Manila with Acapulco, Mexico (Kouichiro Yaginuma, 2012:215). This route is recognized as the most important route for trade between East and West from the 16th to 18th centuries.

In 1571, when Chinese silk was brought to Acapulco, Mexico, it became considerably popular as a luxury item in Nueva Espana and Peru, whose economic power was increased by the silver production. As the silver, which was necessary for Chinese Ming Dynasty as the currency, was brought on the way back to Manila, the Manila galleon trade rapidly developed in the form of triangular trade.

Therefore, as for this triangular trade, it is insisted that there was no trade route between America and Asia before Spain built Manila as the supplies trading center in 1571, so globalization on the earth was started in 1571 (Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, 2006:19-33). It would be reasonable to see 1571, when Chinese silk and South America silver began to be traded, as the beginning of Manila galleon, rather than 1565.

Adam Smith insists as follows about silver playing an important role in the world trade at that time and the trade between Europe and China connecting by silver (Adam Smith, 1776:207).

I think silver of the New World is one of the main products. By this, trade was made between Europe and China, both ends of the old world; by doing so, 2 regions faraway in the world is strongly connected with each other by a thick pipe.

As mentioned above, as silver of the New World America was introduced into the Philippines, Manila began to play a role of go-between connecting Asia, America and metropolitan Spain. In 1573, 2 galleons carried to Acapulco 712 Chinese silver boxes and 22,300 ceramics, and 6 galleons in 1574 and 12 Chinese junks in 1575 carried goods to Manila (Yoshihiro Yamada, 2011: 11-12).

To count up the average Manila galleon trade revenues, it was a huge amount, reaching 10-15% of the overhead costs a year of the Philippines (Carla Rahn Phillips, 1990:98). This amount could be started earnestly by the Europeans' demand for Chinese silk. Asian silk was a product loved by the world, but only China could produce cheap and quality silk.

The background China imported silver was started from the failure of the Ming's monetary policy, which made Ming's bill (baochao) as the standard medium of exchange,
the standard money, in the late 14th century. At that time, the value of Chinese bill plunged compared to the substitute currencies such as copper and silver, due to the excessive issue of baochao.

As for Chinese demand for silver, as Ming Dynasty sought the reform 'single-whip law' in 1570, the tax system that all taxes were paid only by silver was established. As China was a great power with a quarter of the then world population and countries around it maintained the tribute relation, the single-whip law system could be led not only to Asia but also to India, Islam and Europe (Hamashita Takeshi, 1994:97).

That China, a great economic power, used silver as the means for payment caused market price of silver in China to be much more increased than America, Japan and Europe. In the early 16th century, the value ratio between gold and silver in China was 1:6, which shows the value of silver in China was far higher than India(1:8), Persia(1:10) and Europe(1:12). For this reason, it would be natural the silver gathered into China where the relative price of gold was lower and the relative price of silver was twice higher than other areas (Richard von Glahn, 1996:127).

In 1393, the Ming government granted a tax exemption of land to all the farms growing mulberry; as the mulberry growing farms increased due to this, Chinese silk production rose sharply. Around 1550, 150 years later, population engaging in silk in Suzhou, a representative city of silk, reached about 500 thousand people (William S. Atwell, 1977:22-27).

Although Ming Dynasty was also interested in the royal silk factory, the silk industry developed in Qing Dynasty to the extent that it was recognized as a national industry. In Ming Dynasty, royal silk factory in Suzhou had 173 looms and 504 workers, but as Qing Dynasty started in 1685, the scale was four times bigger, with 800 looms and 2,330 workers. It is reported there were 1,863 looms and 7,000 workers, to put together 3 main cities of the silk industry — Hangzhou, Nanjing and Suzhou (Shih Min-Hsiung, 1976:40-41). This development of the silk industry in the late Ming and the early Qing was recognized as the modern industrial revolution of the world before the industrial revolution of the West (Chuan Hang-Sheng, 1975: 100-101). Production was also huge: Bocarro, Portuguese historian in the 17th century, mentioned silk production of China was 2,500t every year; about 800t, a third of the annual production, was exported abroad (George Bryan Souza, 1986:46).

Like this, in that China the huge market could exclusively produce silk and the Spanish Empire had abundant silver, the trade pattern between Spain and Asia, which used silver and silk as media, could be natural. Between 1493 and 1850, about 128,153t of silver was produced in the Spanish American colonies (Mexico: 63,657t; Bolivia: 35,064t; Peru: 29,432t); these figures accounted for 80% of silver production of the world at that time.
Meanwhile, as the production costs of silver was lower in Nueva Espana, Chinese silk became more in the limelight. The price of silk thread in Nueva Espana in 1579 increased almost 7 times the price 40 year ago. The average revenues earned by sending silk from Manila to Nueva Espana at that time reached 100% to 300% of the investment (Kim Dong-yeop, 2012:67).

The Manila galleon trade recognized as the ideal trade also began to decay; the reason began to appear in the metropolitan Spain. Until the 17th century, the Spain Empire got a great benefit thanks to the increase in silver price as the Chinese demand for silver rapidly increased; however, as the silver price dropped due to oversupply of silver in the mid-18th century, Spain suffered heavily. That is to say, as American silver was imported, the value of silver in Spain decreased; therefore, tax revenues collected by silver led to reduction of purchasing power, and the Spanish royal family got into the economically unrecoverable condition (Andre Gunder Frank, 1998:390).

Moreover, the occupied Manila by the British army between 1762 and 1764 implied the decline of the Spanish Empire (Teiichi Ito, 1992:169), and as Spain ordered "Free Trade" in 1778 according to the worldwide stream of the free trade, as trade between colonies and trade between the mainland and colonies were all liberalized, and as most of the harbors were opened, privilege of Spain that had supplied to Asia disappeared and it also lost competitiveness (Seo Seong-cheol, 2013:148). As the U.K., which already entered into the industrial revolution period then, and the Netherlands, which appeared as a sea power, appeared, the Manila galleon trade also began to wane.

Since the mid-18th century, the Manila galleon trade had changed into the ecological trade, rather than the worldwide stream of silver and silk. In the mid-18th century, population of China dramatically increased, which was accelerated by the ecological change in plants. That is to say, as hardy plants such as potatoes, peanuts and corns brought from Nueva Espana (New Spain) by the Manila galleon trade were introduced into China through Manila, famine in China reduced. For example, peanuts were grown in quantity in the vicinity of Shanghai, potatoes in the seaboard of Fujian, and corns in Huanan (Alfred W. Crossby, 1972:199).

Like this, trade with the Western Hemisphere (America) by the meet and contact with the Western people started in the era of silver gave considerable help to humanity compared to silver and silk; John McNeil called the bioenvironmental shock, brought from America to the Pacific area in the 18th century, as the Magellan trade (John R McNeill, 1996:665-96).

From the late 18th century, the Manila galleon trade began to be substituted for the export of sugar, hemp, copra (dried coconut), indigo and other crops rather than silver and
silk, and this export was made by trading ships of many countries; this tendency went through the whole period of the 19th century. This large scale cultivation of the export crops for the Spanish colonialism was imposed on colonies. As the last galleon left Manila in 1811 and returned to Manila from Acapulco in 1815, the galleon trade that had been continued for about 250 years came to an end.

4. The Galleon Trade and the Appearance and Role of Chinese Merchants

In accordance with Recopilacion, the supreme law of the colonized Philippines, the exclusive right to participate in the galleon trade was given only to the Spanish living in the Philippines (Park Seung-u, 2003:7-8). The Spanish in the metropolitan Spain, in Mexico or in other American colonies could not participate in the Manila-Acapulco trade. Merchants in the Philippines had their own exclusive shipowner union then, and people who led the organization made powerful Real Consulado, a kind of the trade board, to control trade. This board of trade was composed of the wealthy in Manila, the influential Spanish and those who spoke for church, army or colonial government. Of course, the common people called encomenderos could engage in this trade according to the Spanish law (Seo Seong-cheol, 2013:140).

On the other hand, the direct counterpart in the trade network of the Spanish in the Philippines during the galleon trade period was the Chinese working in the Southeast Asia. The reason was that they were tied by the residence restriction rule of natives specified in Recopilacion — residents cannot leave Pueblo where they dwell without permission of the parish priest. These Chinese had worked with Barangay near Manila as the center from before the Spanish colonial rule, and the scale became bigger as the galleon trade began in 1570s (Park Seung-u, 2003:17).

As for the increase in the number of the Chinese in the Philippines, there is a statistic of the rapid increase: in 1571, when the Spanish rule by Legazpi was started, 150 people (in Manila only this year); in 1588, 10 thousand; in 1603, 30 thousand; in 1748, 40 thousand (Nanjing Zhou, 1993; 86). The reason the Chinese increased in number like this was because the junk trade of Fujian, China, was organically connected with Manila for the supply of silk, as the Manila galleon trade was established (Nariko Sugaya, 2012:439).

The Chinese in the Fujian coast supplied to the Spanish daily commodities as their important trade counterpart was changed from Indios to the Spanish after the government capital was moved into Manila, and they in quantity dealt with goods to be exported to Acapulco, Mexico, such as silk and ceramics as the Manila galleon trade started. Manila under the Spanish colonial rule was just a harbor near the trading district of South China
Sea, but it rapidly developed in the background of the difference in the exchange ratio of gold and silver between the Spanish world and the Chinese world at that time and was closely connected with the junk trade dominant by the Fujian merchants.

Although it is not easy to statistically clarify the population of the Chinese in the Philippines, the Fujian Chinese are dominant in number, for about 80-90% are from Fujian and the rest 10% from Guangdong. Especially, there are many from Jinjiang of those from Fujian, so there is an opinion that the ratio of the Chinese from Jinjiang accounts for two thirds of the whole overseas Chinese in the Philippines (Guotu Zhuang, 2011:2).

Henry Sy (Chinese name: 施至成), who has maintained the top place of Forbes 40 rich persons in the Philippines for years lately, is from Jinjinang, and Lucio Tan (Chinese name: 陈永栽), in the second place, also from near Jinjiang.

The reason that Jinjiang is called as the hometown of the overseas Chinese in the Philippines is because it has geographical, social and economical backgrounds people had to go abroad to earn money because of many people, insufficient arable land and insufficient food in this region; that the Chinese immigrants from Jinjiang are dominant in the Philippines is a very rare phenomenon even in the Southeast overseas Chinese immigration history.

The Manila galleon trade had a form of the triangular trade connecting Asian countries such as China and Japan, the Philippines and Spanish Mexico; products such as silk and ceramics of the Chinese from Fujian were mostly exchanged with silver produced in Mexico and Peru, and silver and silk were moved into the metropolitan Spain (Onofre D. Corpuz, 1997: 39-40).

There are some materials about the Chinese' sailing to Manila at this period: in 1580s, 30 to 40 junks made a passage to Manila from Fujian and Guangdong every year; these Chinese junks cleared the port in early March, arrived in Manila by a monsoon in 15 to 20 days, and returned in May when the southwest monsoon started to blow (Hideo Matsutake, 1989:32).

The people who settled in the Philippines at the period of the Manila galleon trade was the Chinese (Sangley). From the beginning, they ran a business among the Philippine natives, Spanish colonial government, Catholic church and Islam, but they played a role of the middleman that did not interfere in the colonial administration. These Chinese were the indispensable being for the galleon trade and Spanish Manila government and the threat at the same time. For this reason, the Manila government built Parian, Chinese residential district, in the outside of Intramuros the walled city and took a policy aiming for prohibition of the Chinese movement and tax collection. In 1594, a new Chinese residential district was built for the Chinese converts to Catholicism in the Binondo.
district of Manila (De Viana, 2001:10-18). However, it is hard to say that the conversion business of Chinese immigrants was successful. Even realistically, Catholicism was not forced, and the district just appeared as a new residential district for the Chinese infidel group.

However, as trade continued to develop, the Chinese surpassed the Spanish in number in the trade season in the 17th century, so that Manila became the world's largest Chinatown at that time, as about 20 thousand Chinese people, the largest scale in the Southeast Asian trade zone at that time, settled.

The Spanish rulers were afraid of the rapid increase in the number of Chinese merchants and levied on the Chinese immigrants or continued to oppress them as infidels. Chinese immigrants confronted this by causing revolts almost every 10 years: the Linfeng revolt in 1574; the Panheu revolt in 1593; the Manila revolt in 1603; the Calamba revolt over 40 years from 1639; the Zhengge revolt in 1686 (Nan jing Zhou, 1993:83-84).

For example, in the Manila revolt in 1603, an incident that 25,000 Chinese immigrants, two thirds of the Chinese immigrant living in Manila, lost their life took place, and 5 cases of slaughtering Chinese immigrants occurred just during the early days of the Spanish rule since then: in 1640, 1662, 1687 and 1762 (Mikio Kobayashi, 1992:10-18). The cause was the rapid increase in the number of the Chinese; the reason for the increase was that the Spanish in the ruling class despised physical labor; natives were not accustomed to this labor, so the Chinese had to occupy almost all jobs (Edgar Wickberg, 1964:8). For example, Chinese immigrant laborers occupied almost all the jobs necessary for daily life, such as fisherman, gardener, hunter, weaver, brick maker, lime maker, carpenter, iron maker, tailor, shoemaker, baker, butcher's, candle maker, painter, silversmith, bakery, pharmacist, linen shop, sculptor, restaurant and keysmith (Robert R. Reed 1967: 137). This situation caused the anti-Chinese sentiment among the Spanish government and Indios, which led to the persecution of the Chinese and the Chinese' response to this (Guillermo Ruiz-Stovel, 2009:49-50). After the massacre of the Chinese in 1603, Manila went into an economic recession for a year, and the galleon trade was brought to a standstill.

Like this, as the Chinese merchants at that time of the Manila government under the Spanish rule became already important, the Spanish colonial government itself could not take them away totally. Therefore, despite several times persecution, the Chinese increased. In 1637, the population of the Chinese was as many as it reached about 20 thousand people (Setsuo Ikehata, Shigeru Ikuta, 1977:33). However, the Chinese in Manila in 1650, 13 years later, were 15 thousand, 5 thousand reduced compared to 1637, which was caused by the slaughter of the Chinese in 1640. Given that the Spanish in Manila in 1650 were found 7,350 and the local Indios 20,124, the Chinese population ratio was very high, and the Chinese were twice the number of the Spanish (John Leddy Phelan, 1959:178).
Meanwhile, as the gold and silver exchange ratio became equalized in the mid-17th century around the world, and the raw-silk and silk lost their existing competitiveness in the New World market, the world of the galleon trade crisscrossing 3 continents lost its appeal, and the economic power of Manila began to be lost. Moreover, the Manila trade of Fujian merchants who had supported the Manila galleon trade was reduced, the number of the Chinese living in Manila decreased. Besides, the Frontier-Shift Law, which Qing Dynasty forced people living in the coast to move into the interior and prevented people from helping the lingering power to oppress the Jeong Family regime in Taiwan in 1661, was the compulsory migration policy that moved people to the interior, beyond the level of preventing people from going out to sea. Chinese junks that came and went to Manila were hit by this law, and the Manila galleon trade was also severely hit (Iwanami Shoten, 2001: 223). The tax on the right of abode and the number of people of the Chinese in Manila shows this stream clearly.

As shown in <Table 1> of the collected amount of tax on the right of abode of the Chinese in Manila, 23,750 Chinese people resided in Manila in 1637, but the number was reduced as the Frontier-Shift Law was issued in 1661. It was reduced to 7,527 persons in 1661 and 2,122 in 1680, but as the Frontier-Shift Law was lifted in 1684 and the Chinese immigrants settled again, the number of the Chinese in Manila was increased to 4,000 around 1706.

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<td>59,906</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>22,975</td>
<td>2,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>31,335</td>
<td>3,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mestizo de Sanglay or Chinese mestizo refers to half-Chinese people, who have Chinese father and Filipino (Indio) mother. When they are clearly classified by the tax system was the mid-18th century, when the enlightenment colonial reform was introduced into the Spanish colonies, including the Philippines (PNA, 16-5-5).

The appearance of the Chinese mestizo is related with the Bourbon reform: As for the backgrounds of the Bourbon reform, it should be perceived that the Spanish royal family was changed from the Habsburg to the Bourbon due to the War of the Spanish Succession between 1700 and 1713. Carlos III of the Bourbon royal family implemented reforms called "the Bourbon Reform", to strengthen the power over Spanish colonies in a state of lethargy in the mid-18th century. The main point of this is to increase revenues of the royal family and to solidify the ruling system in colonies, by strengthening control over colonial administration and economic system and improving legal systems (Bernardo Astigueta, 2000:60-61).

It was to adopt the basic policy that prevented silver from being leaked to China above all, by withdrawing from the colonial management dependent upon the Chinese. Deportation of the non-Catholic Chinese implemented by Governor Pedro Manuel de Arandia (incumbency 1754-1759) in 1755 brought considerable change to the Chinese Immigrant society (Nariko Sugaya, 2000:439).

As the first step to make the colonial economic power the Spanish-oriented, it was implemented not only to reduce dependence of the colonial economy upon the Chinese, but also conversion into Catholicism was required to oppress the Chinese living in colonies. As the second step, it tried to establish the Spanish-directed colonial economy, by making the Spanish, Chinese mestizos and Indios participate in commodity distribution, for which the Chinese immigrants were responsible. Besides, it continued to maintain the junk trade with China after the 16th century for the colonial economy and established a policy that classified the Chinese coming and going by trade into infidels (infieles) and Catholics (cristianos). The Chinese immigrant society that agonized over this policy accepted the Western religion Catholicism which was the legitimacy principle of the colonial rule, accepted the rule of the church as Catholics, became Christians through baptism and marriage, and became members of the colonial society as subjects of the Spanish king (Salvador P. Escoto, 2000:209-34).

That is to say, that the Chinese as foreigners were changed from the Chinese to the Filipinos going through desinicization and Catholicization was a unique feature, which did not appear in Baba, the ethnic Chinese of the Chinese paternal line half-blood, in the British Malay colonial period, Perana Kan, half-blood ethnic Chinese of Indonesia in the Dutch colonial period, and Minhung, half-blood ethnic Chinese of Vietnam in the French Indochina colonial period. That is, as the Chinese mestizos (ethnic Chinese) of the
Philippines were recognized as special Filipinos, some Chinese mestizos such as Jose Rizal, Emilio Aguinaldo and Adres Bonifacio led Philippine Nationalism later, to make an independent country through revolution, to be freed from the Spanish rule as a Filipino (Edgar Wickberg 1964:66). However, the Chinese mestizos of other Southeast Asian countries such as Perana Kan, Lukzin and Minhung were just satisfied with accumulating economic power as the middle class of colonies. Therefore, the fact that the Chinese mestizo in the Philippines were in the central position of politics, economy, society and culture in the modern history of the Philippines is unique, and this is the point we think the change from the special foreigner to the special Filipino worked importantly.

After the 18th century, the Chinese who converted into Catholicism ideologically became subjects of the Spanish king and became Filipinos (ethnic Chinese, Chinese mestizo) as the legitimate members of the Spanish colonial Philippines, while the non-convert Chinese were subject to many restrictions in the colonial society as the infidel Chinese (sanglely infiel), who did not obey the authority of the Spanish king. As a result, the number of the Chinese was remarkably reduced, and as their residential district was restricted to Manila, economic activities of the Chinese temporarily declined. When the Spanish Philippine policy or deportation order of the Chinese was implemented, the half-Chinese and half-Filipino mestizos received treatment equivalent to Filipinos, so the Philippine economy was temporarily dominated by the Chinese mestizo (Yu In-seon, 1990:321).

Meanwhile, a new accommodation Alcaicería de SanFernando was built on the skirt of river in the new pasig area for the infidel Chinese who came into Manila from Fujian every year. They were admitted to Alcaicería camp as a rule, and had to return to China after trade.

As the Governor Pedro Manuel de Arandia's deportation policy of the non-Catholic Chinese was implemented by strictly distinguishing Catholic Chinese immigrants from infidel Chinese stayers, all Chinese people in the Spanish Philippines were catholicized as Catholics (Nariko Sugaya, 2005: 20-24). In 1810, when 55 years had passed since the Governor Arandia's deportation policy of the non-Catholic Chinese, the number of Indios, that is, Philippine natives, was 2,395,677, 94.8% of the total population 2,527,298, while the Chinese mestizos increased up to 120,621, about 4.77% of the total population (Austin Craig, 1916).

Pak Seung-u (2003: 1-34) conceptualized the formation process of the Philippine indigenous ruling class under the Spanish colonial rule as the world-system and empathized that the Chinese mestizos who adapted well to the internal change of the colonial socioeconomic system appeared as the key element of the indigenous ruling class and grew as the only indigenous economic group that could confront the Spanish.
In other word, the Chinese immigrants were treated as Filipinos after conversion to Catholicism and became a new class in the Philippines; this Chinese mestizo group became not only a group representing the Chinese in the Philippines later but also an opportunity of taking an important role in the politics, economy and society even in the modern history of the Philippines.

5. Conclusion

As mentioned above, in the Philippines, due to the trade with the Chinese and Arabs, Chinese merchants temporarily stayed even before the Spanish rule, but the Chinese settled in quantity due to the Manila galleon trade. It is not too much to say that the Manila galleon trade was not the simple trade between the Spanish colonies the Philippines and Acapulco in Mexico, but it was the birth of the world trade including even China, which thirsted for demand for silver. The Manila galleon trade was the silk and silver trade appearing in the world history; it was the trade made by the idea of the mercantilist Spanish imperialism, South America and Asia. That is, the Manila galleon trade should be seen not as the simple trade within the Spanish colonies but as the early incident of globalization, and it should be seen as the stream of the world trade, in which Europeans, Asians and South Americans were wholly integrated.

Meanwhile, due to the Chinese junk trade between Fujian and Manila, which brought silk, settlement and residence of the Chinese started and about 20 thousand people stayed, but the Spanish government considered such many Chinese people as a threat, so there were 5 times massacres. Besides, the Chinese junk trade hesitated after the Frontier-Shift Order of the Qing Dynasty, but after the order was lifted, the historical change was brought to the settlement of the ethnic Chinese. For example, although Chinese merchants made a passage for the Chinese junk trade due to the Manila galleon trade and became the Chinese immigrants, the increasing Chinese immigrants led to an anxiety and pressure of the Spanish government, and the Spanish government enforced Catholicism on foreign residents including the Chinese. Due to the Governor Arandia's deportation policy of the non-Catholic Chinese, all the Chinese in the Spanish Philippines were Catholicized and changed from the Chinese to the Chinese mestizos (ethnic Chinese).

That is to say, the Chinese treated as foreigners appeared as new Filipinos believing in Catholicism. After conversion to Catholicism, a new class called the Chinese mestizo was born in the Chinese immigrant society of the Philippines, which is deeply related with deportation of the non-convert Chinese, who became the center of the Manila galleon.

As the Chinese, who appeared as the silk supplier of the Manila galleon trade, could
not settle in the Philippines if they were not the Chinese mestizo (ethnic Chinese) due to the Spanish government policy, Philippine economy became dominated by the Chinese mestizo. In addition, the Chinese mestizo that adapted well to the change in the colonial socioeconomic system appeared as the key element of the indigenous ruling class. This change was deeply related with the Manila galleon trade, and the appearance of the Chinese and the Chinese mestizo also can be a world incident, the beginning of globalization.
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________________. Mitsuko Tamaoki translation, The change of the Jinjiang family register Philippines Chinese corporation of the 1970-1990 and relations with the former domicile place: 1-17.


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Migration, Diaspora and Return: A Study on Information Technology (IT) Professionals in Hyderabad

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India has migration relations with various parts of the world since the ancient times. The migrations took place for various reasons such as trade, propagation of religion and to work on plantations. But Indian migration during the post-colonial era has been mostly professional migration, which is considered as migration of knowledge/skilled workers or brain drain. This process started in 1960 and continued up to the recent times. However, a new trend that is professional migrants return to their homelands. Among such return migrants, IT professionals have returned more to cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad. In order to understand this scenario, a study was conducted on the returnee IT professionals in Hyderabad. Reasons for selecting Hyderabad as the area of study are, among the return Indian professionals, the IT professions are large in number to cities like Hyderabad, secondly there are more Telugu IT professionals in the US, and they are returning in the recent times. This paper tries to examine the causes and conditions that led to both their migration and return. The study used snow-ball sampling technique to find out the respondents, interview schedule and observation methods are used to collect the primary data for this study. Out of 65 respondents in this study, 28 migrated for employment purpose 25 for education, 2 for business, and 10 for various reasons.

Keywords: Migration, Brain Drain, Brain Gain, IT professionals

1. Introduction

People move from one place to another in search of better living conditions. In ancient times people moved as nomads in searching of food and shelter. Similarly, this kind of attitude towards the basic needs of human beings such as economic, social and political has been spread out in a civilized world. In search of better living conditions, migration of human beings created a history of the world. It was more in the case of developing countries like India where migration to the developed countries is a post-independence
phenomenon. Even though the ancient Indian emigration do not relate to the core of idea of this debate, the huge Indian emigration that took place in the colonial and the post-colonial times relates to this phenomenon.

2. Indian migration during the colonial period

Indians have a long history of emigration to other parts of the world. The commercial links of India with west Asia way back to the 10th century BC, with ships moving between the mouth of the river Indus and the Persian Gulf (Narayan 2008). During the pre-colonial era, Indian emigration took place to Southeast Asian countries when the Indian princes, priests, poets, and artisans emigrated for trade and propagation of religion, in the first century AD (Suryanarayana 2003). Indian emigration up to the period of colonial migration mostly took place for trade and commerce between India and various parts of the world.

Indian emigration in the colonial times was occurred to the British, Dutch and French colonies such as Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Suriname, East Africa and South Africa, Singapore and Malaysia to work on sugar, and rubber plantations, construction of railways and establishment of infrastructures. The reasons for emigration of huge number of Indians to the above mentioned countries were mostly because of the economic factors like famines, starvations, apart from the social unrest and political turmoil wherein people did not have enough food, farmers lost lands under the British policies of Raituvari and Mahalvari systems. In order to escape from all these problems, people of India chose migration as an alternative choice to the plantations. Most of the Indians immigrated or recruited under indentured system to the plantation colonies, apart from the Kangany. Kangany means ‘headman’ or ‘overseer’, originated from Tamil language. Indian labour migration in the case of Malaysia and Singapore were not only recruited under indentured system but Kangany too. The indentured system was a contract of labour for a specific period of time under a plantation master. Under this system around 3 million Indians immigrated to the plantations as indentured labourer or coolies. After the abolition of indentured labour in the British Empire, people of India were free to choose their destination places. Even after it was abolished, people of Indian origin did not return mainly because of the economic opportunities available or lack of enough of savings to return back to India. While this scenario gives only one side of Indian emigration to various colonies during the colonial times, the other side saw large number of Indian educated migrants’ destination to the developed countries after India got independence.
3. Indian migration during the post-colonial period

While Indian emigration in the colonial times was labour migration to the British, Dutch and French colonies under the indentured and kangany systems, the Indian emigration in the post-colonial times was educated or professional’s migration. During this period millions of Indian professionals and students immigrated to the various developed countries such as the U. K, the U.S, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This phase of Indian emigration broadly at a largest scale constituted professionals like doctors, engineers, scientists, IT professionals and managers going for jobs, business and research, while students going for higher education. Indian emigration in the post-colonial times has been considered to ‘brain drain’ from various scholars. The reasons for that was Indian emigration in the post-colonial era was mostly migration of the talented professionals, skilled labourers, and entrepreneurs to the developed countries of North America, Europe and Australia (Aleti, K. K 2010).

It is estimated that around 215 million people constituting 3 per cent of world population live outside of native countries (MOIA 2010). Out of 215 millions of international migrants in the world, the Indian Diaspora consists of more than 27 million with its presence in more than 185 countries (MOIA 2011). The Indian diaspora is the third largest diaspora after the British and Chinese Diasporas in the world (Kadekar 2005, Dubey A 2003). As per the latest reports of Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs (2015) the Indian Diaspora is about 28 million. While the People of Indians Origin (PIOs) constitute 17 million, the Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) consists of 11 million. The NRIs are more in developed countries like the U.K, the U.S, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. According to the latest report of MOIA (2015) the Indian Diaspora in U.K is about 1,825,000 in number, the U. S 4,455,909, Australia 486,000 and New Zealand constitute 155,000 (MOIA 2015). The huge number of Indian professional migration in post-colonial era has been a primary debate for various reasons. The reasons of the debate can be understood from the following discussions from the phenomenon of brain drain. The phenomenon of brain drain has changed the demographic profiles of developing and developed countries in general and India in particular in the global era, where out of 125 million populations of India, 28 million are out of India (www.mospi.nic.in).

4. The Phenomenon of Brian Drain

Brain Drain\(^1\) refers to emigration of educated work force from one country to other countries, always from the developing countries to the developed countries. In other
words it is the emigration of the skilled professionals and knowledge workers from a less developed to more developed countries usually on a permanent basis. The ‘brain drain’ is always used to describe the movement of high level-experts from developing countries to industrialized nations (Odhiambo 2005). As Shah (2006) pointed out, brain drain is the phenomenon whereby nations lose skilled labour because there are better jobs available elsewhere. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a concern that India was losing its educated workforce to the west, particularly the United States (Chacko 2007). By 1990s, persons who were born in India and living in the United States numbered over 450,000 (Morning 2001). By the end of 2000, 53 percent of Silicon Valley’s scientist and engineers were of Indian and Chinese origin accounted for over one-quarter of the regions’ scientists and engineers (USCIS 2006). For the last three decades, the literature on labour migration between the developing and developed countries has reflected the view that this migration is associated with a process of ‘brain drain’ (Grubel 1996). Brain Drain is viewed as affecting the economic growth of developing countries due to an outflow of much needed technically skilled people (Bhagwati 1976).

4.1 The Indian Context

From Indian context the brain drain refers to the emigration of doctors, engineers, scientists, accountants, teachers, nurses and technicians. According to Prakash (1998), brain drain was started between the period 1950s and 1960s, where the people who immigrated to the various countries of the world were the technical, administrative and professionally qualified. Brain drain involves the mobility of knowledge workers, the highly qualified, skilled and experienced professionals from relatively less developed to more developed countries (Khadria 1999). Indian scholars such as Sukhatme and Mahadevan (1998: 1285) pointed out that ‘the term “brain drain” is generally used in the context of the outflow of highly qualified and talented manpower which has been trained at considerable expenses to a country and which migrate permanently to any country’.

The causes of brain drain can be broadly divided into two main reasons that are graduates of various professions moving to the developed countries in search of good jobs while students were going for higher education. For Prakash (1998) Indian graduates who intended to move to the developed countries like the United States were the technical, administrative and professionally qualified such as the doctors, engineers, scientists, teachers, nurses accountants and technicians. Several scholars such as S. P. Sukhatme, Amartya Sen, I. Mahadevan, Binod Khadria and Ashok Jain’s work give various dimensions to the understanding of the causes of brain drain from the Indian context. According to Sen (1973), income differences, and high salaries in the developed countries were the main attraction for the developing countries. According to a study on Indians abroad by
National Institute of Science Technology and Development Studies of CSIR in 1993-94, the lack of contacts with foreign colleagues is viewed as a strong driving force for emigration of Indian scientists. Moreover, the scientists working in areas of highly specialized disciplines often feels isolated (Sukhatme 1994).

The failures of government to provide good administration, jobs to the professionally qualified people, and facilities for strong research recommended emigration of Indian talent to the developed countries. India is a cause for Indian ‘brain drain’ (Kamalesh Ray 1971). According to Deepak Kapur and Roli Varma (1989) reasons for “brain drain are due to low salaries, rigid regulations, bureaucracy leading to nepotism, as well as lack of career opportunities and institutions for advanced graduates studies and research”, (Kapur, D & Varma, R 1989: 317). They also highlighted that students and professionals from developing countries look for better opportunities both for economic as well as education in the developed countries. The table-1 describes the emigration of Indians to the United States for one decade.

Table 1 reveals that from 1998 to 2007 there has been continues migration of Indians of various categories to the United States. Apart from other categories, Indians going for employment has been more in number, and there was no reduction in people searching for employment. This directly or indirectly reflect the intention of Indians going for employment, and to stay at a considerable period of time compared to the other categories, which allows them as permanent residents.

Table 1. Indian immigrants legally admitted to US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Family sponsored preferences</th>
<th>Employment based preferences</th>
<th>Immediate relatives of US citizens</th>
<th>Refugees and Asylums</th>
<th>Diversity</th>
<th>Cancellation or removal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Person Naturalized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>15,375</td>
<td>9,533</td>
<td>11,058</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36,482</td>
<td>16,978</td>
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<td>15,179</td>
<td>5,362</td>
<td>9,356</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>30,237</td>
<td>30,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15,557</td>
<td>11,543</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>42,406</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>15,443</td>
<td>39,010</td>
<td>14,714</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>34,240</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11,402</td>
<td>42,885</td>
<td>15,077</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71,105</td>
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<td>12,693</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>133</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>16,942</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15,551</td>
<td>28,703</td>
<td>18,205</td>
<td>2,680</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>65,353</td>
<td>46,871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Migration of Telugu professionals to the United States

Migration of Andhras or Telugu professionals to the developed countries like the U.K, the U.S, and Canada is a post-colonial phenomenon. Many Telugu professionals before 1950s had not heard of immigration to the U.S. In the beginning of 1950s, very less immigrated to the US, and they mainly resided in New Work. They were less than hundred in the 1950s (Manjulath, A 2000). The migration of Telugus to the U. S in the early 1950s, very small but it took momentum during the late 1960s after the quota system was abolished in the U.S and new Act of 1965 was passed. The initial Telugu migrants to the U.S were doctors; their migration started in the 1960s (Chandrasekar, B, & Bhaskar, T. L. S, 2001). The Telugu doctors were recruited to fill the less presence of doctors in the US, gape created with the migration of doctors in the U.S to Vietnam during the Vietnam War (Manjulath, A 2000). During the 1970s and 1980s, the Telugus were seen migrating as doctors to the U.S (Chandrasekar, B, & Bhaskar, T. L. S, 2001). But the demand for Indian doctors did not last for long time, and was shifted to other professionals like engineers, scientists, and teachers, others.

By 1980s, a chain migration of Telugu professionals to the U.S was creased out of opportunities available in aboard with the immigrants already settled. With changes in migration policies and technological advancements, the number of Telugu migrants to the U.S increased much more. However, the advent of Information Technology changed the profile of Indian community in the U.S from the doctors, engineers and scientists to the IT professionals, where after 1990s there was a lot of migration of IT professionals to the U.S. This also caused changes in the 1980s with the software industry expansion in India, especially in states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Among the Indian IT professionals in the U.S, Telugu professionals occupied a significant position in number and its community, and they excelled in socio-and economic domains. The Telugu in the U.S formed the major proportion of software professionals from 1990s with the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990s (Chandrasekar, B, & Bhaskar, T. L. S, 2001).

6. Phenomenon of Brain Gain

Return migration of Indian professionals is the recent phenomenon in Indian and especially to the cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad. It has been refereed to brain gain (Aleti, K. K 2010), brain circulation (Saxenian 2005, Kapur, D & Varma, R 2013), Brian Retain (Kapur, D & Varma, R 2013) and brain return. Annalee Saxeanian describes brain gain into brain circulation. In her own words “the same individuals who left their home
countries for better life styles abroad, are now reversing the brain drain, as they return home to establish business relationship or to start new companies which maintained their social and professional ties to the US” (Saxenian, A 2005: 2). Deepak Kapur and Roli Varma define brain circulation is seen as the drain gain for developing countries and a loss for the developed countries. Similarly, the term brain gain is describes in positive manner by Appleyard, where he considered that the return migrants with new idea, skills and ambitions tends to have a major positive impact on developing countries’ s economic growth and social structure (Appleyard 1989).

7. Return migration of Indian IT professionals

Indian professionals’ return migration started because of the developments of software industries in India. The developments of companies like Yahoo, Hewlett Packard, and General Electrical opened operations in India largely because of the confidence that generated by the pressure of many Indians working in their US operations. In the 1990s an increasing number of traditional Fortune 500 companies as well as newer multinational technology corporations turned to India for software programming and development along with, call centers and back up offices operations. India’s revenue from exports of this industry was expected to grow by 25% a year to $60 billion by 2010 (NASSCOM Report 2005). Industry giants like General Electrical, Microsoft Corporation, and Dell Inc. rapidly increased their workforce in India. Many MNCs like Motorola, Larsen, Turdro and Siemen actively recruited NRIs to work in their Indian based operations (Chacko 2007).

Simultaneously, Indian IT leaders like Infosys² technologies, Wipro and Tata consultancy services increased recruitment and extended their domain to other parts of the world, setting up offices in the US, Canada, Europe, East Asia, Australia, and the Middle East. Infosys technologies recruited 25 Asian Indian graduates from premier American universities for its competitive 100 seat summer internship. Leading Indian technology firms also looked to hire Indians with experience of the US for middle and top level positions and estimate that between 5 and 12 per cent of job applications are from NRIs.³ Indeed Indians returning professions have been viewed as catalyst for economic and social development (NASSCOM Report 2005). One of the other causes of return migration of IT professionals apart from the developmental efforts in India was the security concerns in the post 9/11 period, were contributed for somewhat to return back where Asian Indians, mistakenly referred as Arabs, were used to go back to their country on the basis of discrimination.
In the 1990s, the US census shows that 2.5 million highly skilled immigrants have been excluding or migrating to their origin countries (Rapaport 2002). The return migration of Indian professionals mainly took place to the cities such as Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh and Bangalore in Karnataka state (NASSCOM Report 2005). Because of the growth and development of these cities, Bangalore and Hyderabad became magnets for returning IT, finance and management professionals for a number of reasons. In response to globalization, many cities develop specific cultures to woo high-tech professionals, investment and business. These cities have acquired ‘trade recognition’ as hubs in the India and global IT industry (Behrman and Rondinelli 2002). According to a study, there are about 71 of the 75 MNCs in Bangalore and Hyderabad software technology parks were headed by Indians who had lived and worked overseas, especially in the US (Kapur 2002).

These two cities, Hyderabad and Bangalore in India, are developed like world class cites, these cities maintain concurrent multi standard relations between home and host societies (Chacho 2007). The world cites here means that, it has knowledge based activities like research, education, the creative art, and attracts highly-skilled migrants (Beaveredge and Smith 1996). These cities not only attract the highly skilled workers, but also provide a cosmopolitan environment characterized by diversity and openness (Yeoh and Chang 2001). These two cities have become as information and technology cities with the contribution of the liberalization policies, and the increasing role of the MNCs, which not only played their role in shifting of technology from the developed countries to the third world countries, but giving support in finance too (Ramachandriah and Bawa 2000).

The reverse migration of highly skilled workforce is mainly to take advantage of new growth and employment opportunities in India and to start new set ups in its large metropolitan cities. “Some of those who came back to India did so, because jobs in the US information technology industry dried up in the aftermath of a slump between 2000 and 2004, and other professionals were established permanent residents while citizens of the US are returning after spending years abroad” (Chacko 2007: 134). The economic reforms of 1991, while helpful to all sectors of the economy, were particularly important for the software exports. Although the 1991 reforms signaled that India had become receptive to foreign investments, it led many MNCs to enter India, around 70 MNCs entered India by 1999. Indian professional’s reverse migration to Hyderabad is a new phenomenon resulted of the recent developments in infrastructure facilities of Information Technology and Software companies. The above mentioned information reveals the available opportunities that attracted Indian professionals and IT professionals to India. Since this study is focused on Hyderabad, let us turn to return migration of IT
professionals to Hyderabad.

8. The Context of the Study

The city of Hyderabad was founded in the late 16th century on the banks of Musi River as the capital city of the Golconda Kingdom, which fell to Mughal Empire in 1687, and became a provincial capital till 1763, when the Nizam made it a full-fledged capital (Ramachandriah and Bawa 2000). The city Hyderabad emerged as the capital city of Andhra Pradesh in the year 1956, with the Indian Union in 1948, after the linguistic reorganization of states in India. Hyderabad city is the sixth largest populous cities in India, the population of Hyderabad were 3,059,262 according to the census of 1991, 3,637,483 in 2001, and it was estimated that the number of population would be 4,068,611 by 2010 (http://world-gazetteer.com). According to the Census of 2011 the population Hyderabad is about 7,749,343 (www.indiaonlinegapes.com). Andhra Pradesh accounts for 23% of its software professionals in India, by the records of National Association of Software and Service Companies (www.nasscom.com). Hyderabad appears to be as an Information City in India, helped to build domestic services in 1999 to 2000, which spent more than a third of all domestic IT spending in India, compared to 23% in the US in the same year (Ramachandriah and Bawa 2000).

A number of engineering student’s from Andhra Pradesh have gone to the US for opportunities in the last several years. It is estimated that Andhra Pradesh accounts for 30-40% of the H1-B applicants to the Consulate-General which is more than any other state in south India (Ramachandraiah and Bawa 2000: 570). The education stream is quite strong in engineering and other technical courses in the state. By the late 1990s India produced about 65,000 engineers and 95,000 diploma holders annually in engineering and technology, through a large network of public and private colleges (Kapur 2002). The Andhra Pradesh education was producing nearly 100,000 IT professionals annually. The increasing wage premium for technically skilled human capital has raised the demand for higher education (Kapur 2002). Hyderabad as capital city of Andhra Pradesh, with the number of engineering colleges took development from 32 to 107 in the last five years, and is estimated that further 30 colleges will be added, along with the 600 colleges, offering courses in computer applications (Ramachadriah and Bawa 2000).

Moreover, new world class educational institutions are being set up in the more reformist oriented states such as Bangalore, Chennai, Mumbai and Hyderabad. For instance, in 2000, Motorola signed an agreement to set up Motorola School of Communication Technology at the Indian Institute of Information Technology (IIIT) in Hyderabad, as one
of the Silicon triangle (Chandra et al. 2006). The Motorola School of Communication Technology is designed as a state-of-the-art center to create new talent by providing advanced IT and telecom education, while the school offers research and development opportunities to innovate new approaches to wireless communication for Indian trade market (www.ap-it.com). Other schools such as the Indian School of Business which is also located in Hyderabad, is designed to provide business education in India in collaboration with the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and Kellogg School of Business at Northwestern University.

The leading Indian software companies in Hyderabad are expected to play active role in the IT, a new Indian Institute of Information Technology (IIIT) was started in the year 1998 (Chacko 2007). Birla Institute of Technology and Science (BITS), has announced its third campus in India at Hyderabad and Software giants like Metamoor, IBM, and Oracle have started their schools in India. Apart from education stream, the city of Hyderabad has been receiving investments from external sources, including the World Bank (e.g., for infrastructure development under the Mega City Project) (Chacko 2007). The rationale for their selection appears to be making these already big cities attract for foreign investments as a part of the New Economic Policy of the Government of India. The emergence of Hyderabad as a Hi-Tec City acquires significance in the concept of the liberalization process that has been taken place in India.

8.1 The Hi-Tec City

The Hi-Tec City (Hyderabad Information Technological and Engineering Consultancy City), a major technology township which is at the center of the information technology industry in Hyderabad, constructed in the year 1998 under the Chief Minister of the state Mr. N. Chandrababu Naidu. He gave high priority to software industry and information technology which is evident in the progress of Hi-Tec City (Ramachandriah and Bawa 2000). Soon after, India started an IT revolution in cities like Bangalore, Mumbai, Chennai and Delhi as key IT hubs. The government of Andhra Pradesh realized the need for infrastructure to attract investments of several IT companies. The Government realized a well-known fact that a large number of IT professionals working in Silicon Valley and other technology hubs were from the state. So, this has prompted the government to start the project with private investments (The Times of India – 25 October 2005). Due to the establishments of Hi-Tec City in Hyderabad most of the developments were taken place to the northwest of the city in the Madhapur, Gachibowli, Nanakramguda, and Vatingunapally areas (Ramachandriah and Bawa 2000).

The Hi-Tec City attracted major technology companies like Microsoft, Oracle, Dell,
Motorola, Deloitte, HSBC, GE and Convergys. This InfoCity is spread over 151 acres and has a total built-up area of 5 million square feet, which provides employment to about 45,000 professionals (The Business India, 29 March 2005). Soon several other companies started to partner with the government, after the project’s success. It comprises of IT parks such as L&T Infocity, Vanenburg IT park or THE V, Mindspace Cyberabad SEZ, DLF IT SEZ, Satyam computers IT SEZ, TCS Synergy park IT SEZ, SEZs of Infosys, Wipro and APIIC etc. built to suit campuses of several major technology companies (www.telugupedia.com).

The idea of establishment of Hi-Tec City led to the constructions such as Cyber Towers, which is the first phase of Hi-Tech City and was inaugurated in November 1998, it include companies like 7Hills Business Solutions, AppLabs, Keane, Microsoft, Patni Computer Systems, Oracle Corporation, GE Capital and Prithvi Information Solutions, Orbees, Four Soft operate offshore development facilities or call centers. The Cyber Gateway is Phase II of Hi-Tec City, a giant arch in front of the building stands as a gateway to the rest of Hi-Tec City, was designed for ITES (Information Technology Enabled Services) and BPO (Business Process Outsourcing) services with multiple redundancies for connectivity and power. Large offshore processing operations operate out of this building, such as Dell Inc., General Electric, Capitol Records, Lanco Global Systems and Microsoft were the first companies to start operations at the Cyber Gateway. They were later followed by Oracle, Virtusa, Vertex Computer Systems and others, which grew up in size and operations soon after the establishment.

Other IT parks like Cyber Pearl (Cyber Oasis) park accommodates over 5000 IT professionals with 5 million square feet of office space are Companies located at Cyber Towers. The Mindspace IT Park was envisioned by Raheja Corp, which identified the need for a world-class environment and ecosystem to foster great business ideas. Companies such as IBM, Accenture, CSC, Bank of America, and Novartis have built to suit facilities in the park with 10000 professionals working within them. The park is a notified SEZ and is now trying to accommodate about 55000 IT professionals making it as the largest of the IT parks in Hi-Tec City.

Software Park, INFOSYS has shifted its Head Office from Bangalore Campus to Hyderabad to set up a Campus at least four times in size compared to Bangalore, an area of 2000 acres for the development of various Software Products & Services. Along with the software parks, the Hardware parks too, came up for manufacturing the Research and Development base for INTEL, AMD, ZEN technologies and many more reputable Semiconductor MNCs (The Times of India, 25 October 2005). Nanotech Park – estimated investment of 1 billion US Dollars, laid the foundation of the Company's presence, which would provide direct employment to around 20,000 skilled personnel. Its Phase II was
anticipated to complete by 2010, thereby creating a job pool of around 100,000 people. Gems and Jewelry Park have created job opportunities for two thousand people by the end of 2008, in which several MNC Jewelers especially from Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other countries came up to establish their branches (*The Hindu*, 17 February 2006).

Reliance has recently acquired 25,000 acres of Land around the Vijayawada Highway at Ibrahimpatnam to set up its LPG Gas Plant, an eight-lane direct road links the Reliance Plant area to the Shamshabad ring road. Another development is the Textiles Park - 500 acres of land has been allotted to SARODE HYCOT TEXTILES. This will be the largest Textile Park ever to set up by the Central Government and will create job opportunities for at least 100,000 people by establishing close to 2000 Power loom Units between 2008 and 2010 (*The Deccan Chronicle*, 30 November 2004). The Dubai Government is interested in partnering with AP Government to develop the Hyderabad Knowledge Corridor. The Project – the Hyderabad Knowledge Corridor – is aimed at being the hub for all IT activities from animation to financial software. Dr. J.C. Mohanty, principal secretary to the IT and Communications Department for Government of Andhra Pradesh, explained in an interview with *the Business India*, that this project will laid down across 20,000 acres of land stretching from Kanamet to Kollur covering about 34 revenue villages (*The Business India*, 29 March 2005).

Other developments of Hyderabad city to attract the non-resident Indians, apart from Hi-Tec City is, Hyderabad International Airport – which is considered as India's largest airport spread over an extent of 5500 acres. This International Airport serves as an International Aviation Hub for the international air traffic of North America, Europe and Far East. It began its operations on 23 March 2008 (*The Times of India*, 25 October 2005). In order to make the easy travel facility to the Airport, the Government of Andhra Pradesh has constructed the India's biggest/longest fly-over - from Mehdipatnam, to Hyderabad International Airport at Shamshabad. Aero Park, which would cater to the Aerospace and Aeronautics Industry, was established near the Hyderabad International Airport under the aegis of the Federation of Andhra Pradesh Small Industries Associations. Due to the establishment of Hyderabad International Airport, Hyderabad has emerged as a major centre in production of various Aerospace & Aeronautical components & sub-systems. In total, there are currently around 60 Units manufactured with an annual turnover of 150 crores (*The Hindu*, 16 January 2006). To substantiate the literature that is available for the return migration of Indian IT professionals to Hyderabad, a study was done in Hyderabad among the return migrates. The primary data of this study are discussed in the below.
9. Findings

In order to understand the causes for return migration of IT professionals in Hyderabad, a study was conducted among 65 respondents returned from the United States between 2005 and 2010. Initially to find out the addresses of these Indian returnees, I have relied on internet sources and later done a pilot study. To find out the addresses of these communities I used snow ball sampling technique. Few of the respondents gave information about the further respondents living in other places of the Hyderabad city. Information for this study was collected through a structured interview schedule. The reasons for selecting Hyderabad as area of study was that about 23 % Indian IT professionals in the US are from the state of United Andhra Pradesh, and these professionals in the recent times are now returning back to their homeland in large number. To substantiate the primary data I also used secondary sources. The table-2 shows the background of the respondents.

Table 2. Profile of the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No of respondents</th>
<th>Age 25-34</th>
<th>Age 35-44</th>
<th>Age 45-55</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Unmarried</th>
<th>Religion Hindu</th>
<th>Religion Muslim</th>
<th>Education B.tech</th>
<th>Education M.tech</th>
<th>Education MBA+ M.tech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows that out of total 65 respondents, there are 44 males, and 21 females. Among these respondents, 22 male respondents are between the age group of 25-34 years, while 35-44 age groups are 15 respondents and 7 respondents are in the age group of 45-55. Among the total number of respondents 59 respondents are married and the remaining 6 are unmarried. 57 respondents are belongs to Hindu and the remaining 8 respondents belong to Muslim. 32 respondents had M.tech degrees, 18 had B.tech degrees, and 8 had both M.tech and MBA degrees.

There are mainly four causes that the respondents answered about the question on their migration to the United States such as for the job purpose (28 respondents), for education purpose (25 respondents), for business purpose (2 respondents), and other purposes (10 respondents), such as family sponsored, and/or accompanying spouses after marriage.

According to the literature on Indian brain drain, the lack of promotional prospects, poor management, declining health service, inadequate living conditions, problems of job
insecurity and lack of infrastructure for education are some of the reasons for higher
migration rates. One respondent opined that, it is the Indian elementary education which
creates the problem from the beginning. In her own words:

If changes have to take place in our education system, it has to firstly come from the
elementary education level. Because in our Indian elementary education system,
students are nurturing just like passive listeners but not the active ones, in which
students think logically, and which is a distinctive difference between the Indian
students and the students studying abroad. (Madhuri, female, age 36)

Another respondent said that:

In the recent times the elementary teachers are seen as secondary compared to others,
but in reality they play an important role in the society in training the students at their
early stage so that they can serve as a resource for successive generations. (Srinivas,
male, age 29)

Change has to come in the elementary education by recruitment of skilled people.
Significantly, Indian education system has to be changed in providing the infrastructure
facilities for higher research and development and by eliminating the practices that are
happening in education field such as inequality in education, caste biasness, recruitment
of standardized teachers etc. Education is becoming a costly affair in India, which is not
that much abroad. Finally, in India quality of education for getting a job is not yet
successful. In other words, it is not able to provide the job security after completing the
education, so this has to be changed.

From others point of view, Indian education is good, but sometimes it pressurize the
younger generations for their basic needs. It means, although one likes a course of study,
for their livelihood she/he has to opt for other courses. Moreover India has a deep rooted
system of malfunctioning. So this need to be changed and need to encourage the online
education, in which people will learn knowledge though online. Apart from the lack of
opportunities for employment, infrastructure for good education, improper administrative
system is also a factor which drives the people of one country to go out when the
economic position is not good. Indian government’s failure in providing research
facilities for higher education, premier institutes to carry out their research, financial
sources to carry out higher education essentially passionate them to move to the
developed countries. After education getting job is essential thing for survival of human
beings. When there are no opportunities to live well, people do migrate or move to others places. According to this study more number of migrants moved for jobs and their intensity to migration also is more. “Sometimes it’s better to go where the opportunities are more instead of being an unemployed and criticize their government”. But this kind of attitude towards job searching led to not getting employment abroad and settling their without coming back has been a threat to the developed of India.

According to one respondent (Sree), Indian government is responsible for Indian professional’s migration to developed countries. In her own words:

I know the brain drain is worse for a developing country like India. After my double masters in Computer Application from the Indian’s one of the best engineering college (College of Engineering, Anna University), I did not get any job. I was selected for work in Election Commission as a senior programmer on a contract basis for Rs 5000/ per month. Every six months, I need to count our hours to get the contract renewed or not, if the government is kind enough, I get the renewal. Like that, I spent for two years. However, with the help of my friend, I was able get my H1 visa and left for the US. Now my last year’s income is much more than I would have earned here in India. I came to India six months back. Now my question to the government is who is responsible for my emigration?

Motivation for emigration is one the question of interview schedule of the study. This study identified four types of motivations for migration. Self motivated for education category is more. Between male migrants and female migrants there are more number of male migrants who gone by self motivation, while many female migrants motivated by parents. Remaining was motivated for business and other reasons. According to data received from this study through other question, most of the migrants did not get any support for their migration. Most of the respondents said that they did not receive any financial or any support from the government of India. However most of the respondents were relied on family, some respondents said that they got support by the private banks. Out of 65 respondents, 25 wrote examinations for their migration to abroad, 40 did not write exam. This shows that respondents who wrote for their migration they went education while remaining 40 respondents went for jobs. So, they did not write any examinations. From this way also the study is saying that more number of respondents gone for jobs followed by education.

The return migrants who gone through various categories of visas for going abroad, are categorized into five categories such as H1B, H1, L1A, H1B1, and Student Visa. Out of
22 female respondents 10 gone on education visa, the remaining are for job and others purposes. While majority of male migrants gone with employment visas, others gone through students visas. By this table also information related to the visa types, indicates that majority of respondents gone for jobs (44) remaining 25 gone for education.

**Table 3. Usefulness of cultural programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think that the cultural programs organized by the Indians can be useful for Indians while staying abroad?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 shows the usefulness of attending cultural programs which is to understand respondent’s conducted by Indian communities abroad was more positive. Out of 65, 41 male migrants and 20 female migrants said that those programs are very helpful for their integration into the host society. “Moreover those help to get away from the feeling of being living in isolation by attending programs such as cultural programs, marriage reception and other programs of get together of Indian community in host countries”. But somebody responded that “sometimes these cultural programs can make differences between rich and poor earnings”. Only seven percent respondents answered negatively by saying that the cultural programs organized by the Indians in the host country do not help much in their life.

**Table 4. Difficulty while staying abroad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did you face any difficulty during your stay abroad?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the reasons for Indians leaving to the developed countries such as the U. S, U. K and Canada is for better standard of living and better work atmosphere, good system of administration and without any significant discrimination. Similar response has been received from the data also. Table 4 shows difficulty while staying abroad. Out of 65 respondents, 36 male and 18 female respondents answered that they did not get any
discrimination related job, adjustment to live a good life, apart from the minor problems of initial settlement. Other respondents about 8 replied yes, while remaining three migrants did not answered anything.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Once in 6 months</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>More than two years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Various responses received related to frequency of visits to home land during their stay abroad, reasons may be to meet their family members, relatives and friends. The return migrants come to participate in the cultural festivals or marriage/birth/death ceremonies. All the respondents of this study replied that they have visited home land for various reasons during their stay abroad. Based on the frequencies of visits, this study divided in to three types such as visiting ones in six months, one year and two years. Out of 65 respondents, majority about (40) visited ones in year, while others visited ones in six months and two years. This study gives some dimensions of understanding of these migrants. Interesting facts about these people is who visit ones in six months (13) their financial status may be more, and they come to look after their business establishments or deal their business. Others who visit ones in two years (12) might not be settled well and trying to cope up with little bit financial sources to manage their visits to meet their family or friends. Others who visit ones in a year, to attend meet their family and friends by participating in to the cultural programs. It also reminds that they tried to be in touch with home land even though they are working abroad.

To find out the return migration and did they get any suggestions by any one questions are asked. The answered are divided in to three types such as Yes, No, and No answered. Out of 65 respondents, 45 did not suggested by any to return back to Indian, which means they returned on their own decision, problems may be family, loss of job and searching a new life in India. Sometimes it also to get away from the western life styles which is against to the traditional venues of Indian society after staying a considerable period of time. This can add to make a separation of their children to studies well and to follow their traditional values. Generally these values are adopted either from their religion or place of living. This shows that they decided to return to India, while about 16 respondents suggested by someone may be family members, friends to return back to India.
Reasons for return migration of the migrants received new dimensions from this study. Out of 65 respondents 20 male and 11 female migrants returned back to Indian to stay with their family members after their financial target of life abroad was achieved, which means that earning of money was the main purpose of their migration, while 21 male and 5 female respondents replied to find out the jobs in India. The remaining was return may be the reasons like to establish their new companies or business deals. According to one respond in his own words “ones I reached my financial target of earning abroad, I decided to return back to India where my entire is staying away, I feel lonely over there. After a few years staying abroad life becomes bore there without family friends, so feels to stay with the relatives”. According to data collected from this study even though Indians migrated to various places for various reasons like education, employment and business, but they would like to return back to Indians after their financial target is reached abroad. Because of which India has become a true homeland in the mind set of return migrants.

After the return migration of these Indians have they thought of establishing of any enterprise, and do they think that government of India is giving support to establish, questions were asked to get information. Of the total respondents, 30 male and 12 female migrants replied no, while 10 male and 07 female migrants answered yes. This shows that majority of return migrants did not come to establish any enterprise. According to one of the respondents, “there is no chance of thinking Indian government’s contribution because of misadministration and corruption”. But the small number of migrants who replied yes might be known some of the supports available to establish any new company.

Table 6. Intention about future visit abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would like to go back to your destination country in future?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 shows intention about future visit abroad. After return migration, some of the respondents about 19 male and 8 female respondents are interested to go back to their destination countries, while 25 male and 13 female migrants did not think to re back to their destination places. This shows that some of the migrants who thought of go back to their destination places, may be in the category of youngsters, having passion for good
working style of companies abroad, or may be came for business settlement purpose and meeting of the family and friends in India. However through majority of migrants who answered yes, it shows that their commitment of staying at homeland with family members and to start a new life.

Finally this study tried to get information pertaining to ‘brain drain’ and its impact on Indian economy. Out of 65, 21 male and 10 female migrants answered yes, and they also accepted the impact of migration professionals on Indian economy. But others about 28 migrants replied no and they said that there is no impact of migration on Indian economy, where countries like India have more number of educated people. One of this category responded that ‘it is essential to have international outlook and thus there is a need for migration of professionals when they have no opportunities at home and it also balances the unemployment of Indian. But when the opportunities provided at home they have to return back and work for the homeland’.

10. Conclusion

While ‘brain drain’ designated the international transfer of resources in the form of human capital i.e., the migration of relatively highly educated individuals from the developing countries to the developed countries, ‘brain gain’ is considered as the return migration of these professionals to their homeland. Even though the migration of educated professionals from the developing countries to the developed countries at the onset dreadful, the reverse flow of the same professionals from their destination countries became relaxation by bringing back the educated workforce with an international exposure, innovation, and potentiality. But this is not good enough to the public sector of Indian, because the return migrants are getting in to the private sector only. Because of which their work experiences, western knowledge, international exposure to solve the problems of public sector of India not given importance. For them, their international skills and work experiences should be used to the development of nation either directly or indirectly but not the private sectors. These private sectors are in abroad and Indian too, but their profits will not strengthen the building of nation. So, efforts are need to be taken to attract more number of the return migrants by framing policies that offers any king of security either social or economic in private or public sector, to improvise Indian economy based on the efforts return migrants. For this, new policies are requested from the return migrants.
Endnotes

1 The term ‘brain drain’ is originated in the 1960s, to describe large-scale immigration of British scientist to the United States by Royal Society in 1963. It is commonly referred as the movement of human capital from developing countries to the developed countries (Kapur, D & Varma, R, 2013).

2 Infosys recruited 16878 employees in the year 2005-06, 22,567 in the 2006, 22671 2008-2009 and in 2009-2010 it recruited around 21196 employees. Like this many Indian companies’ developments attracted the Indians to return to India (The Vartha, June 21, 2010).

3 The term NRIs popularly refers to “members of the Indian diaspora, including Indian citizens living abroad” (Chishti 2007: 3).

4 The Indian School of Business (ISB) is a private Indian business school. It was established in 2001 in Hyderabad. It was awarded as the first business schools in South Asia by the Association to Advance Collegiate schools of Business (AACSB) in 2011 (www.business-standard.com).
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Appendix I

Editorial Policy

Ethical Policy

Submission Guidelines
Article I - General

Section 1 The International Journal of Global Diaspora Studies (JGDS) is a scientific journal in the English language published by the World Association of Global Diaspora Studies (WADIS). JGDS is intended for publication of research and review articles on all aspects of Global Diaspora and relevant fields such as International migration, Transnationalism, Multiculturalism, Global Network, and Identities.

Article II - Management of the Editorial Committee

Section 2 Selection of editor-in-chief and formation of editorial committee shall be in accordance with the section 13 in the Constitution of the WADIS.

Section 3 The Editorial Committee will be appointed in the following terms.
1. The members of the editorial committee should be regular member of the WADIS.
2. The Editor-in-chief should be experience less than 30 editorial committee members in consideration of professional experience, major field, and engaged institutions, and he/she is appointed by the president of the WADIS. If the position among members is vacated, it will be filled in the same way.

Section 4 The Editor assumes that author(s) listed in a manuscript have agreed with the following policy of the JGDS on submission of manuscripts. Except for the negotiated secondary publication, submitted manuscripts to the journal must be previously unpublished and not be under consideration for publication elsewhere.

Section 5 Under any circumstances, the identities of the reviewers will not be revealed. If a new author is added or an author is deleted after the submission, it is the responsibility of the corresponding author to ensure the author(s) agreement about the change in authorship. The JGDS has no responsibility for such changes.

Section 6 All published manuscripts become the permanent property of the JGDS and cannot be published elsewhere without written permission.
Article III – Manuscript Submission

Section 7 The JGDS submission procedure is as follows.
1. Manuscripts Preparation – Manuscripts must be written in according to the Submission Guidelines following editorial requirements of the JGDS.
2. Manuscripts Submission – All manuscripts should be submitted online via the journal’s website (www.wadis.or.kr) by the corresponding author. All articles shall be submitted before the deadline.
3. Notification of Submission - Authors of manuscripts is notified by E-mail when the manuscripts are received.

Section 8 The JGDS is written in English and published biannually on February 28th, June 30th and October 31st. Authors can submit Manuscripts all through the years.

Article IV – Review Process and Acceptance

Section 9 The JGDS reviews all received manuscripts. First, the format of manuscript is reviewed and then sent to two most relevant reviewers who are selected by recommendation of the editorial committee members or from the experts’ database. Authors’ name and affiliation are removed during peer reviews.

Section 10 Acceptance of the Manuscript is decided based on the critiques and recommended decision of the reviewers. A reviewer may recommend “acceptance without revision,” “acceptance after minor revisions,” “review again after revisions,” or “rejection.”

Section 11 If there is a marked discrepancy in the decisions between two reviewers or between the opinions of the author and reviewer(s), the editor may send the manuscript to another reviewer for additional comments and a recommended decision. Three times of “review again after revision” is regarded as a “rejection.” The reviewed manuscripts are returned back to the corresponding author with comments and recommended revisions. Names and decisions of the reviewers are masked. A final decision on acceptance or rejection for publication is forwarded to the corresponding author from the editorial office.

Section 12 The peer review process takes usually three to five weeks after submission manuscript. Revisions should be made reflecting comments made by reviewers. The revised manuscript should be resubmitted via the web system. Failure to resubmit the revised manuscript within 1 month without any notice from the corresponding author is regarded as withdrawal. The corresponding author must indicate clearly what alterations have been made in response to the reviewer’s comments point by point. Acceptable reasons should be given for noncompliance with any recommendation of reviewers.

Supplementary Rules

Supplementary 1 The Editorial Policy shall be active from January, 1st 2013.
Article I - General

Section 1 The World Association of Global Diaspora Studies (WADIS) shall respect the academic creativity of members, protect the academic rights, and strive to enhance the quality of the researches.

Section 2 The International Journal of Global Diaspora Studies (JGDS) shall prevent any unfair ethical conduct by the editorial committee members, reviewers, and authors.

Article II – Ethical Rule

Section 3 Each of the following is applicable as misconduct to research:
1. Making false of research outcomes
2. Distorting research outcomes by fabricating of research data
3. Plagiarizing another’s idea or research results
4. Publishing or printing the same study as overlap

Section 4 Any inquiries into research misconduct and judgment shall be in accordance with the following procedure:
1. Editorial Committee shall ascertain whether reported or perceived research misconduct actually happened or not.
2. The decision whether the misconduct is true or not shall be decided by a vote of a majority of the present editorial committee members, but it is requested for attendance of more than 50 percent among editorial committee members for judgment.
3. The related editorial committee members of the misconducts at the relevant year shall be excluded from the decision procedure.

Section 5 Measures to take action on research misconducts shall be in accordance with the following procedure:
1. If the submitted manuscript is decided as an unfair ethical conduct, the editorial committee shall inform the decision to the authors of the manuscript not to publish and also inform relevant president of the institution.
2. If the published paper is decided as an unfair ethical conduct, the editorial committee shall inform the decision to the authors and relevant president of the institution of invalidate publication of the paper, and shall announce the result of the incidents at the JGDS.
Article III – Ethical Policy for Editorial Committee Member

Section 6 The editorial committee members shall be responsible for whether the paper publishes or not, and should respect authors’ personality and research independence.

Section 7 The editorial committee members must deal with the papers fairly base on quality of papers and guidelines of submission, without not only authors’ gender, age, affiliation but also any prejudice or private connection.

Section 8 The editorial committee members must deal with the papers fairly base on quality of papers and guidelines of submission, without not only authors’ gender, age, affiliation but also any prejudice or private connection.

Section 9 The editorial committee members must not know any information about the authors or papers to every single person except reviewers related to the papers before the decision of the publication whether accept or not.

Article IV - Ethical Policy for Reviewer

Section 10 The reviewers must sincerely evaluate the requested paper from the editorial committee members within a certain period of time and inform the editorial committee members of the evaluated result. If reviewers are not the right person to evaluate the papers, must notify the editorial committee members about the situation.

Section 11 The reviewers must evaluate fairly according to their academic belief and the standard objective. It must not be undervalue the papers without specifying sufficient reasons, or eliminate the paper by reasons of discrepancy in reviewers’ own opinion and perspective.

Section 12 The reviewers must respect authors’ personality and academic independence. The evaluated statement of paper should be indicated reviewers’ own comments and recommended revisions on the papers if necessary.

Section 13 The reviewers are ethically bound to absolute confidentiality about the paper. The manuscript should not be showed or discussed with other persons unless it’s absolutely compelled. Besides, a part of the manuscript should not to quote without authors’ permission.

Article V – Ethical Policy for Author

Section 14 The JGDS does not allow any form of plagiarism. Plagiarism is using the ideas, data, or language of another without specific or proper acknowledgment. If you present someone’s words, thoughts or data as your own, you are committing plagiarism. Authors are expected to cite explicitly others’ work and ideas, even if the work or ideas are not quoted verbatim or paraphrased. This policy shall be followed whether the previous work is published, unpublished, or electronically available. Any kinds of plagiarism are unacceptable.
Section 15 Self-plagiarism is unacceptable publishing behavior. Authors recycle portions of their previous writings by using identical or nearly identical sentences or paragraphs from earlier writings in subsequent research papers, without quotation or acknowledgement. Authors should minimize their recycling of previous writings. If recycling is unavoidable, the authors should inform the Editor at the same time of submission and reference the previous writings in the manuscript. Such self-referencing should be worded carefully to avoid compromising the double-blind review process.

Section 16 When an author submits a manuscript to the JGDS, the manuscript must be an original work. Authors must not submit the same work, in whole or in part, to two places of publication at the same time, or while the manuscript is under review at the JGDS. The manuscript must not have been previously published or accepted for publication elsewhere, either in whole (including book chapters) or in part (including paragraphs of text or exhibits) in English or another language.

Section 17 Authorship credit should be based on 1) substantial contributions to conception and design, acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of data; 2) drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual content; and 3) final approval of the version to be published. Authors should meet conditions 1, 2, and 3. When a group conducts the work, the group should identify the individuals who accept directly the responsibility for the manuscript and the corresponding author should clearly indicate the preferred citation and identify all individual authors as well as the group name. Journals generally list other members of the group in the Acknowledgments. Acquisition of funding, collection of data, or general supervision of the research group alone does not constitute authorship.

Supplementary Rules

Supplementary 1 The Ethical Policy shall be active from January 1st, 2013.

Supplementary 2 The JGDS reserves the right to evaluate issues regarding Article-V on a case-by-case basis.
All submission should be made online at http://wadis.or.kr. New users should first create an account. Manuscripts may be submitted in MS Word. These files will be converted into a PDF file for the review process.

**SUBMISSION DEADLINES**

Manuscripts submitted to the WADIS will be reviewed on a rolling basis. Authors can submit Manuscripts all through the years.

**MANUSCRIPT PREPARATION**

The length of the text normally should not exceed 7,500 words. Wide margins should be left all around the text on each page, including at least 4 cm on the left-hand margin. All pages, including Notes, References and tables, should be numbered.

A standard typeface (Times New Roman) is preferred. Articles should be written in English. UK or US spellings may be used with ‘-ize’ spellings as given in the Oxford English Dictionary. Use a clear readable style, avoiding jargon. Abbreviations and technical terms must normally be explained in the text.

Manuscripts are divided into sections, which must be arranged in the following order: Title page, Abstract, Introduction, Materials and Methods, Results, Discussion, Acknowledgments, References, Tables, and Figures.

Each manuscript should contain;
- Title page with full title and subtitle (if any). Full name of each author with current affiliation and full contact details plus short biographical note should be supplied on this page.
- Abstract of 100-200 words and around 5 key words.
- Main text should be clearly organized, with a clear hierarchy of headings and subheadings. A hierarchy of headings and subheadings should not normally exceed three levels. Section headings should be emboldened, indented, and run in with the text.
- End notes is necessary which should be signaled in the text by superscript numbers and provided as a list at the end of the manuscripts.
- Acknowledgements should avoid identifying any of the authors prior to peer review.
- References should be cited in the text by author and date (name, date). The corresponding list of
References should be typed or printed separately double-spaced at the end of the article beginning on a new page and titled merely ‘References’; this title should be left-justified. The list should be alphabetical by surname of author or first co-author and should be in the style of the following examples.

Reference

**Books (or reports): One Author**

Author Last, First. Year of Pub. *Title*. Location of Publisher: Publisher.


**Book: Two or More Authors**

Author Last, First., and Author First Last. Year of Pub. *Title*. Location of Publisher: Publisher.


**Book Chapter**

Author Last, First. Year of Pub. “Title of Chapter/Article.” In *Title*, edited by First Last, inclusive page numbers. Location of Publisher: Publisher.


**Editor, translator, or compiler instead of author**

Author Last, First, trans. Year of Pub. *Title*. Location of Publisher: Publisher.


**Electronic Books**

Author Last, First. Year of Publication. *Title*. Location of Publisher: Publisher. URL.


**Print Journal Article**

Author Last, First. Year of Pub. “Title.” *Journal Name* volume # (issue #): inclusive page numbers.


**Online Journal Article**

Author Last, First. Year of Publication. “Title.” *Journal Name* volume # (issue #): inclusive page numbers. Accessed date. URL.

Dissertations and Theses

Paper presented at a meeting or conference
Author Last, First. Year. “Title.” Paper presented at Conference name, Place, Date.

Article in a newspaper or popular magazine
Author Last, First. Year. “Title.” Newspaper name, Date.

Website
Organization name. Year. “title.” URL.
McDonald’s Corporation. 2008. “McDonald’s Happy Meal Toy Safety Facts.”
Constitution of the WADIS

Officers of the WADIS
Constitution of the World Association of Global Diaspora Studies

※ Note: Constitution written in English refers only to the constitution in Korean.

Article I - General

Section 1 The name of this Association shall be The World Association of Global Diaspora Studies (hereinafter 'the Association').

Section 2 Its registered main office shall be in the Republic of Korea and may establish a branch of the Association, if necessary.

Section 3 The objective of the Association shall be to promote scholarship in Global Diaspora as well as to foster interaction among members.

Section 4 The activity of the Association shall be to accomplish the object of the Association stipulated below:
1. Research in the field of Global Diaspora
2. Publishing of a scholarly journal
3. Meeting the societal demands for constructive study of Global Diaspora
4. Promoting of worldwide scholarly exchange for mutual cooperation and understanding
5. All other activities and amity requisite to the fulfillment of this Association's goal

Article II - Membership

Section 5 Membership is open to any person who shall support the tenets of the Association and shall submit a membership application.

Section 6 The membership criteria of the Association are given below:
1. Regular members
   1) Regular members of the Association shall specialize in Global Diaspora Studies and must currently hold a teaching position (full-time instructorship or higher) at a college or university (or an equivalent institution of higher education) including retired professor.
   2) Regular members of the Association shall be engaged in the public and private institution or research center related to Global Diaspora Studies.
   3) Regular members shall have a Master’s Degree in Diaspora Studies or shall work in parliament and media outlets, or shall manage business to contribute to the development of
2. Associate member

Associate members of the Association shall be undergraduate or graduate students majoring in Diaspora Studies or relevant fields.

3. Corporate member

Corporate members of the Association shall be the corporations, the organizations, or the institutions that shall endorse the purpose of the Association and join the Association.

4. Special members

1) A person who contributes to the improvement of Diaspora Studies and relevant fields.
2) Its person who makes major contributions for the activities of the Association.
3) A special member may obtain a lifetime membership by paying the lifetime membership dues that are established by the Executive Council.

Section 7 The Members of the Association shall have a membership by the following procedures.

1. Regular or associate member shall be recommended by two regular members and shall submit an application that needs confirmation by the Executive Council.
2. Corporate member's membership application shall be submitted by the Executive Officer of the entity and needs to be approved by the Executive Council.
3. Special members shall be qualified by the resolution of the Board of Directors and be inducted into the honorary president, adviser, honorary director, etc.

Section 8 The claims and obligations of the members

1. All members shall be eligible to participate in the General Meeting, to receive journal issues and other publications, and to participate in all activities of the Association.
2. Regular members shall be eligible to vote in elections.
3. Regular members shall be the officers of the Association.
4. Corporate members shall appoint one person who is allowed to attend meetings and have a vote in elections as a regular member.
5. Members shall pay dues according to the decision of the Board of Directors.

Section 9 Membership of the Association shall be revoked in the following cases

1. Members who die or withdraw their membership from the Association.
2. Members who demonstrate gross delinquency in the payment of their membership dues are determined to expulsion by the Executive Council.
3. Members who conduct contrary conviction to the stated purpose and mission of the Association and/or who blemish the honor and reputation of the Association.
4. However, after becoming a member of the Association, the change of the status of a member shall not affect the membership.
Article III - Officers

Section 10 1. There shall be a president, a number of vice-presidents, and two auditors, and appoint-ments for a term of two calendar years and shall serve consecutive way.
2. The President shall be elected by General Assembly and vice-presidents shall be designated by the President according to the consideration of the regional arrangement among regular members.

Section 11 The President
1. The President shall serve as the primary representative of the Association and shall oversee all aspects of the Association's operations.
2. The President shall become the chairman of the Board of Directors and Executive Council.
3. The President shall convene and preside over general meetings.
4. The President shall form the board of directors and Executive Council.
5. Any other rights that are customarily granted to the office of the presidency.

Section 12 The Vice President shall assist and serve as acting President in the absence of the President by the president of delegation and shall maintain seniority.

Section 13 The Board of Directors shall consist of 50 delegates among the regular members by request of the President and appointments shall be for a term of two calendar years and shall be served con-secutively.

Section 14 The Board of Directors
1. The Board of Directors shall elect special members and, shall nominate and appoint an honorary chairman, advisor, and consultant.
2. The Board of Directors shall decide to the expulsion of a member from the Association.
3. The Board of Directors shall resolve the matters submitted by the General meeting.

Section 15 The decision of the Board of Directors shall be a majority of total present members.

Section 16 The Executive Council shall consist of 20 delegates including the President and the Vice-Presidents as a permanent body of the Association.

Section 17 The Executive Officers shall be appointed by the President from delegates. The President can delegate its authority of general affairs, research, publication, and liaison to the Executive officers.

Section 18 The Executive Council
1. The Executive Council shall approve the admission of regular, associate, and corporate members.
2. The Executive Council shall resolve the convocation of an extraordinary general meeting.
3. The Executive Council shall resolve the affairs that are established of the authorities of the
General Assembly and the Executive Council.
4. The Executive Council shall approve the matters delegated by the Board of Directors.

Section 19 The decision of the Executive Council shall consist of a majority of total present members.

Section 20 The auditors shall be elected by the General Assembly, examine the management of the President, the management the Board of Directors, accounts of the Association and shall report the results to the next General Assembly.

Section 21 The President may appoint a permanent paid secretary to handle the affairs of the Association.

Article IV - Meeting

Section 22 The meetings of the Association shall consist of a regular general meeting, a special general meeting, a board of directors meeting, and an executive council meeting; the President can organize and operate a subcommittee by necessity.

Section 23 1. The regular general meeting shall convene once a year in December, the Special General meeting, the Board of Directors meeting, and the Executive meeting shall be convened by the President.
2. The Special General meeting shall be convened by the President in response to the request of the Executive Council or the request of more than 30 regular members.
3. The President shall inform the purpose and agenda of the general meeting to individual current members with handouts or other relevant ways at least seven days in advance of the meeting date.

Section 24 The General Assembly
1. The General Assembly shall concern the amendment of the constitution.
2. The General Assembly shall concern its rights granted by the Constitution.
3. The General Assembly shall concern the matters submitted by the President, Board of Directors, and Executive Council.
4. The General Assembly shall concern the election of the President and Auditor.
5. The General Assembly shall concern the members’ rights and duties.
6. Other authorities generally included to the General Assembly.

Section 25 The passing of motions shall require the assent of 50 percent of the attending members.
Article V - Asset and Accounting

Section 26 Funds procured
1. Membership dues and admission fees
2. Contributions
3. Donations
4. Financial returns from various projects
5. The acceptance of contributions and donations shall be decided by the Executive Council.

Section 27 The assets of the Association
1. Property on the attached list
2. Membership dues and admission fees
3. Defaults arising from the assets
4. Financial returns from various projects
5. Other incomes

Section 28 The assets of the Association shall consist of assets and ordinary assets, and its contents are as follows.
1. The primary assets shall be in any of the following cases, but it will not be able to provide collateral or disposal. However, it will be able to provide collateral or disposal through the resolution of the General Assembly in the case of being absolutely compelled.
   1) Property designated as the primary asset from raising funds
   2) Property designated as the primary asset by the resolution of the Board of Directors
2. All other property not designated as the primary asset shall be ordinary assets.

Section 29 The Association's expenses shall be paid with ordinary assets.

Section 30 The Association's assets shall be managed by the President per policies and procedures that are established by the Board of Directors.

Section 31 Cash shall be deposited with financial institutions or shall be converted to treasury bills or bonds that are a low risk portfolio.

Section 32 All or a portion of surplus from the fiscal year result shall be designated as primary asset or forwarded to the next fiscal year.

Section 33 The President is responsible for the Association's budgeting and its execution.

Section 34 The Association's fiscal year shall begin on the date of the annual general meeting and end on the day before the next year's annual general meeting.

Section 35 The Association's budget of revenues and expenditures every year are decided by taking the President's confirmation through the resolutions of the Board of Directors within two months after the commencement of the fiscal year.
Section 36 The Association’s settlement of revenues and expenditures can bring the special account by the resolutions of the Board of Directors, after the President prepares the annual accounts with the list of current property and then submit the report to an auditor within fifteen days after the close of the fiscal year.

Section 37 All the profit or surplus from the special account should be permanent property or ordinary property.

Article VI - Activity

Section 38 The Association shall publish a journal once a year. All matters concerning publication shall be decided by the Executive Council.

Section 39 The Association shall have an annual conference at least once a year. All matters concerning presentation shall be decided by the Executive Council.

Section 40 The Association shall perform various regular and irregular projects and their details shall be decided by the President, the Executive Council, and the Board of Directors depending on the features. A special committee shall be established under carried out projects by necessity and its bylaws shall be determined by the resolution of the Executive Council.

Article VII - Change and Dissolution of the Constitution

Section 41 This article shall be changed by the decision of the General Assembly. However, if the Association is reorganized as a corporation aggregate, it must obtain permission from the competent authorities.

Section 42 The Association shall be dissolved under Civil Code Section 77 and 78. However, in the event of dissolution of the Association, all remaining assets shall be denoted to a professional Association of comparable disposition through the resolution of the General Assembly and permission from the competent authorities.

Supplementary Rules

Supplementary 1 The Constitution of the Association shall be active from May 29th, 2012.

Supplementary 2 The office of the Association, despite Section 2 of the Constitution, shall be changed to the inhabited area of the new president elected by the General Assembly.
Officers of the World Association of Global Diaspora Studies
(As of April, 2014)

※ Note: The names of each category are in alphabetical order.

**President:** Chae-wan Lim (S. Korea, Chonnam National Univ.)

**Advisor:**
- Ajay Dubey (Jawaharlal Nehru Univ.)
- Eliezer Ben-Rafael (Israel, Tel-Aviv Univ.)
- Kwang-kyu Lee (S. Korea, International Center for Korean Culture)
- Manas Chatterji (U.S.A., Binghamton Univ.)

**Auditor:**
- Hwang Yoon (S. Korea, Sunmoon Univ.)
- Shi Xueqin (China, Xiamen Univ.)

**Vice-president:**
- Absattarov Raushanbek (Kazakhstan, Kazakh National Pedagogical Univ. Abai)
- Aparajita Biswas (India, Univ. of Mumbai)
- Chang-mo Choi (S. Korea, Kunkuk Univ.)
- Sung-suk Yoon (S. Korea, Chonnam National Univ.)
- Zhuang Guotu (China, Xiamen Univ.)

**Standing Committee:**
- Ajay Dubey (India, Jawaharlal Nehru Univ.)
- Ajaya K. Sahoo (India, Univ. of Hyderabad)
- Angelo Ishi (Japan, Musashi Univ.)
- Gabriel Sheffer (Israel, Hebrew Univ.)
- Kashiwazaki Chikako (Japan, Keio Univ.)
- German Kim (Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies)
- Manas Chatterji (U.S.A., Binghamton Univ.)
- Nailya Seisen (Kazakhstan, Kazakh National Pedagogical Univ. Abai)
- Sergei Cheshko (Russia, Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography)
- Uzi Rebhun (Israel, Hebrew Univ.)
- William Safran (U.S.A., Univ. of Colorado)
- Wu Xiao An (China, Peking Univ.)
- Yossi Shain (Israel, Tel-Aviv Univ.)
- Zhuang Guotu (China, Xiamen Univ.)

**Board of Directors**

**General Director:** Manas Chatterji (U.S.A., Binghamton Univ.)

**Research Director:**
- Angelo Ishi (Japan, Musashi Univ.)
- German Kim (Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies)
Sato Noriko (Japan, Pukyong National Univ.)

Editorial Director: Ajay Dubey (India, Jawaharlal Nehru Univ.)
  Ajaya K. Sahoo (India, Univ. of Hyderabad)
  Gabriel Sheffer (Israel, Hebrew Univ.)
  In-jin Yoon (S. Korea, Korea Univ.)
  Kashiwazaki Chikako (Japan, Keio Univ.)
  Sergei Cheshko (Russia, Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography)
  Stanislav Tkachenko (Russia, Saint Petersburg State Univ.)
  William Safran (U.S.A., Univ. of Colorado)
  Wu Xiao An (China, Peking Univ.)
  Yossi Shain (Israel, Tel-Aviv Univ.)
  Zhuang Guotu (China, Xiamen Univ.)

International Cooperation Director:
  Nailiya Seisen (Kazakhstan, Kazakh National Pedagogical Univ. Abai)
  Uzi Rebhun (Israel, Hebrew Univ.)

Editorial Committee
  Chief: Ajay Dubey (India, Organization for Diaspora Initiatives & Jawaharlal Nehru Univ.)
  Member: Ajaya K. Sahoo (India, Univ. of Hyderabad)
  Alla Ye. Atamanenko (Ukraine, Institute of Ukrainian Diaspora Studies)
  Anjali Roy (India, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur)
  Binod Khadria (India, Jawaharlal Nehru Univ.)
  Brian Catlos (U.S.A., Univ. of Colorado)
  Chikako Kashiwazaki (Japan, Keio Univ.)
  Eliezer Ben-Rafael (Israel, Tel-Aviv Univ.)
  Gabriel Sheffer (Israel, Hebrew Univ.)
  Hyung-kwon Jeon (S. Korea, Chonnam National Univ.)
  In-jin Yoon (S. Korea, Korea Univ.)
  Irudaya Rajan S. (India, Centre for Development Studies)
  John Eade (U.K., Univ. College London)
  Jualyneee E. Dodson (U.S.A., Michigan State Univ.)
  Peggy Levitt (U.S.A. Wellesley College, US)
  Sergei Cheshko (Russia, Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography)
  William Safran (U.S.A., Univ. of Colorado)
  Wu Xiao An (China, Peking Univ.)
  Yeo Kok Kheng (Malaysia, Univ. of Malaya)
  Yossi Shain (Israel, Tel-Aviv Univ.)
  Zhuang Guotu (China, Xiamen Univ.)
Research Committee

African Diaspora
Chief: Jualynne E. Dodson (U.S.A., Michigan State Univ.)
Member: Ajay Dubey (India, Jawaharlal Nehru Univ.)
        Aparajita Biswas (India, Univ. of Mumbai)
        Dong-ju Choi (S. Korea, Sookmyung Women's Univ.)

Chinese Diaspora
Chief: Wang Wangbo (China, Xiamen Univ.)
Member: Liao Xiao Jian (China, Academy of Overseas Chinese studies in Jinan Univ.)
        Shi Guoqing (China, Research Center for Resettlement, Hohai Univ.)

CIS Diaspora
Chief: Absattarov Raushanbek (Kazakhstan, Kazakh National Pedagogical Univ. Abai)
Member: Alla Ye. Atamanenko (Ukraine, Institute of Ukrainian Diaspora Studies)
        Sergei Cheshko (Russia, Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography)

Indian Diaspora
Chief: Irudaya Rajan S. (India, Univ. of Hyderabad)
Member: Ajay Dubey (India, Jawaharlal Nehru Univ.)
        Ajaya K. Sahoo (India, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur)
        Anjali Roy (India, Centre for Development Studies)

Islam Diaspora
Member: Brian Catlos (U.S.A., Univ. of Colorado)
        Byung-ha Hwang (S. Korea, Chosun Univ.)
        Sato Noriko (Japan, Pukyong National Univ.)

Japanese Diaspora
Chief: Angelo Ishi (Japan, Musashi Univ.)

Jewish Diaspora
Chief: Gabriel Sheffer (Israel, Hebrew Univ.)
Member: Chang-mo Choi (S. Korea, Konkuk Univ.)
        Uzi Rebhun (Israel, Hebrew Univ.)
        William Safran (U.S.A., Univ. of Colorado)

Korean Diaspora
Member: Valeriy Khan (Uzbekistan, Institute of History of Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan)
        Woo-gill Choi (S. Korea, Sunmoon Univ.)